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5RESUMEN
Esta investigacio´n estudia la movilidad intergeneracional de educacio´n en Ame´rica Latina en
el periodo de 2006-2013. Mediante estimaciones de Mı´nimos Cuadrados Ordinarios y de Re-
gresio´n Cuantı´lica, se prueba que la regio´n todavı´a presenta niveles bajos de movilidad. Existen
claras diferencias entre paı´ses, y para la mayorı´a de ellos, la movilidad ha aumentado a lo largo
del periodo que se estudia, lo que concuerda con la reduccio´n de desigualdad de la regio´n en
la u´ltima de´cada. Adema´s, las no linearidades son significativas tanto para el principal regresor
(educacio´n de los padres) como para la variable dependiente (educacio´n de los hijos). Existe una
relacio´n co´ncava significativa entre la educacio´n de los hijos y la de los padres, y la movilidad es
menor a medida que nos movemos hacia la parte ma´s baja de la distribucio´n de la educacio´n de
los hijos. Por lo tanto, los resultados de esta investigacio´n sugieren la existencia de una trampa
educacional para los que poseen menos educacio´n. Se sobre estima la movildad cuando no se
incluyen no linearidades en el modelo.
Palabras clave: educacio´n, movildiad intergeneracional, igualdad de oportunidades, desigual-
dad, regresio´n cuantı´lica, no linearidad, Ame´rica Latina.
6ABSTRACT
This paper studies educational intergenerational mobility in Latin America in the period of
2006-2013. With the use of Ordinary Least Square and Quantile Regression estimations, it
shows that the region still presents low levels of mobility. There are clear differences between
countries, and for most of them, mobility has increased across the period of study, which goes
along with the inequality reduction of the region in the last decade. Furthermore, non-linearities
are significant both on the main regressor (parental education) and on the dependent variable
(educational attainment of the children). There is a significant concave relationship between
educational attainment and parental education, and mobility is lower as we move towards the
bottom of the children’s education distribution. Therefore, the results of this paper suggest the
existence of an education trap for the least educated. Mobility is being overestimated when
non-linearities are not added to the model.
Keywords: education, intergenerational mobility, equality of opportunities, inequality, quan-
tile regression, non-linearity, Latin America.
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1 Introduction
One of the main socioeconomic problems in Latin America is its inequality, being considered
one of the most unequal regions in the world.1 This is due in large part to the high concentration
of income at the top of the distribution. In fact, if we drop the richest 10% of households in
terms of income per capita from the distribution, in many Latin American countries the Gini
coefficient would be similar to that in the United States (Birdsall et al., 2011). Inequality has de-
clined in most countries since the early 2000s, and several economic and political causes for that
been studied. However, there have also been some recent studies questioning the sustainability
of this decline now that the commodities boom is over.2
There is plenty of research on inequality in the region.3 Nevertheless, it is mostly based on
cross-sectional data, which shows inequality at a specific point in time. Depending on the level
of social mobility, two societies with similar snapshots of their income distributions can have
different social welfare levels. This means that these two societies can have differences in the
character of their inequality depending on their mobility levels. In particular, the opportunities
to move from one quantile to the next one in the income distribution may be different from
one place to another. If there both societies have the same level of inequality, but one is more
rigid (less socially mobile), then we should be more concerned about this one because it offers
less equality of opportunities. In this case, we do not only have class separation, but also class
perpetuation.
When talking about equality of opportunities, we enter into the subject of intergenerational
mobility. In order to analyze this topic, it is inevitable to study the effect of family background
on future income, education, or any other socioeconomic outcome. In a perfectly mobile soci-
ety, opportunities in the labor market will be the same for different people regardless of their
parents’ economic and social status.
It might be the case that the labor market is rewarding the kind of ‘merit’ that adds eco-
nomic value-skills, knowledge, and intelligence. But, if there is inequality of opportunities, the
1See for example BID (1998); Bourguignon & Morrison (2002).
2See for example Gachet et al. (2017).
3See for example Birdsall et al. (2011); Gasparini et al. (2016); Cornia (2014).
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unfairness lies not in the competition itself, but in the chances to prepare for it (Reeves, 2017).
The more dependence an individual has on its parental background in order to achieve a socioe-
conomic outcome, the less mobile the society is, and the lower the equality of opportunities. In
this context, this paper aims to study the dependence of education on parental background. We
focus on this variable because of its importance as a determinant of a person’s socioeconomic
status.
Most of the existing literature about social mobility in Latin America is based on the av-
erage individual of a society. However, some insights such as transitional matrices suggest
the existence of non-linearities, both on the dependent and the independent variables. For this
reason, this paper studies intergenerational mobility adding a non-linear term of the parental
background variable, and at the same time computing a quantile regression to address non-
linearities across the distribution of the children socioeconomic outcome. The study is carried
out for 18 Latin American countries in the period of 2006-2013.
This paper offers three major results. First, educational mobility increases across the period
of study, which is consistent with the reduction of inequality in the region. Second, there are
important differences of mobility between countries, but the ranking depends on which econo-
metric model is used. Finally, non-linearities are significant, both for parental education and
educational attainment of the offspring. Adding squared parental education shows that there is
a significant concave relationship. The quantile regression suggests that mobility increases as
we move towards the top of the educational attainment distribution.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Intergenerational Mobility, Equality of Opportunity and the Impor-
tance of Family Background
Parents can have a direct effect on their offspring’s future income through many sources: the
inheritance of genetic endowments to children, home investments, the role of their income on
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determining the schooling level, the choice of school, etc. All of these factors will in turn
determine the children’s final schooling level, on which their future income depends.
Given this dependence across generations, the main motivation for this study is the impor-
tance of intergenerational mobility for public policy in Latin America. The concept of equality
of opportunity links them. In fact, according to Hertz et al. (2007), the correlation between the
socioeconomic status of parents and their adult offspring, i.e. intergenerational mobility, can be
interpreted as a measure of a society’s failure to provide equality of opportunity from differing
family background.
Most of the literature on equality of opportunity starts from the distinction made by Roe-
mer (1998) between circumstances and efforts. Circumstances refer to those factors for which
individuals cannot be held responsible, such as family background, birthplace, gender and race.
On the other hand, efforts are factors over which individuals do have control, such as occu-
pational choice. From this, we can define equality of opportunities as a situation in which
individual socioeconomic attainment, measured in the case of this study by educational attain-
ment, is distributed independently of circumstances (Torche, 2014). This is often viewed as a
“leveled playing field”. In this sense, the concept of equality of opportunity is important be-
cause inequalities of outcome are indefensible when and only when they are due to differential
circumstances (Romer, 2004).
The relationship between intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity has been
widely studied.4 In general, when family background determines more of a socioeconomic
attainment (i.e. when there is less equality of opprtunity), intergenerational mobility will be
lower. When the outcome does not depend on the circumstances of an individual, such as
family background, equality of opportunity will be achieved. Therefore, changes in public
policy should aim to promote greater benefits to the relatively disadvantaged (Corak, 2013).
Research on the importance of family background in Latin America has found that parental
education is one the most, if not the most, important circumstances that affect the offsprings’
outcome Torche (2014). Behrman et al. (2000) found that higher parental income and parental
4See for example Romer (2004); Corak (2013); Brunori & Peragine (2013).
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education cause a decrease of the children’s schooling gap.5 Other studies, like Marrero &
Rodriguez (2011), suggest that, although the importance of circumstances vary across countries,
inequality of opportunities in Latin America is much wider than in industrialized countries.
Torche also argues that what may foster mobility in Latin America is high returns to educa-
tion,6 but at the same time, they might create an “inherited meritocracy” because of the barriers
that the lower segments face to accessing education.7 This phenomenon might be a result of ed-
ucational policies in Latin America that first restricted educational expansion and later focused
on the postsecondary level before expanding secondary schooling.8 In fact, Neidho¨fer (2016)
found that in the region, increasing returns to human capital cause lower intergenerational mo-
bility.
Latin America might have a similar situation as the The United States, where according
to Reeves (2017) there exists a meritocratic market, but an unfair society. “The labor market
does a good job rewarding the kind of ‘merit’ that adds economic value-skills, knowledge, and
intelligence. The unfairness lies not in the competition itself, but in the chances to prepare for
it” (Reeves, 2017, p. 75).
2.2 Defining Mobility
Now that the importance of intergenerational mobility has been stated as a way to guarantee
equality of opportunity in the Latin American context, it is important to specify the concept
of mobility that will be used in this study. Mobility is multifaceted, and different mobility
indices measure different mobility concepts, which is why Fields (2005) strongly encourages
researchers to first define the concept of mobility to be used.
Mobility has been a topic of study in both sociology and economics. This is what economists
tend to think about it: ”the transformation of a vector of incomes (or some other measure of
well-being or economic achievement) in an initial period into another income vector in a second
5This is also consistent with the findings of Arends-Kuenning & Duryea (2006).
6In fact, Daude (2011) found that most Latin American countries have higher returns to education than OECD
countries, and a higher correlation between parental and child education.
7Behrman et al. (2000) make an extensive review of why marginal private benefits of schooling may be associ-
ated with family background in the presence of market imperfections.
8Morley (2001) discusses these policies in Latin America.
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period, and possibly onward to subsequent periods.” (Ferreira et al., 2013, p. 24). However, this
concept can be somewhat ambiguous, which is why three questions need to be answered in
order to impart meaning to the view of mobility presented above.
The first question refers to the space of economic mobility, i.e., mobility of what? Mobility
could refer to current or permanent incomes, labor earnings, consumption, education attain-
ment, etc. The second question is about the domains of economic mobility, which can be either
intragenerational or intergenerational. The former refers to the mobility of the same individual
over time, while the latter refers to the mobility across generations, such as from fathers to sons
or from mothers to daughters. The third question refers to the concept of mobility that one seeks
to capture. For this, Ferreira et al. (2013), based on the taxonomy developed by Fields (2000),
present three basic concepts of mobility:
1. Mobility as a movement, which consists of four sub-concepts:
(a) Directional income movement: the extent of the net upward or downward movement
in individual incomes.
(b) Non-directional income movement: extent of gross movement in income (income
falls are added to income gains).
(c) Share movement: extent of movement in relative incomes.
(d) Positional movement: Positional movement takes place when there is a change in
individuals’ economic positions (ranks, centiles, deciles, or quintiles)
2. Mobility as origin independence: in this view, “a more mobile society is one where one’s
(or one’s parents’) initial position is a less important determinant of one’s future position”
(Ferreira et al., 2013, p. 25).
3. Mobility as equalizer of long-term incomes: here, a more mobile society is one where
inequality of permanent income is less than inequality at any given point in time.
This paper uses intergenerational mobility of educational attainment, and the concept to be
used is as origin independence.
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2.3 Studies on Latin America and Measurement
Although most of the studies about inequality in Latin America have been from a static per-
spective, which present snapshots of inequality, the literature on social mobility has grown fast,
especially in the last decade. The reason why these type of studies emerged later than in de-
veloped countries is mostly the lack of panel data, which is the most appropriate for mobility
questions.
Given that the region still does not count with a long-run harmonized panel data survey,9
researchers on mobility have found at least two different ways to address this problem. The first
one is the construction of synthetic panel data;10 and the second one is a cross-section analysis,
with either sibling or intergenerational correlations (Solon, 1999).
Dahan & Gaviria (2001) is one of the few studies that has implemented the methodology of
sibling correlations in Latin America, finding that there are substantial differences within the
region, and that social mobility increases with mean schooling and income per capita. On the
other hand, there is a broader variety of studies based on intergenerational correlations. Here,
there are at least two strategies to circumvent the lack of panel data. Behrman et al. (2001)
use both of them: First, they rely on household surveys that included retrospective questions
on parental socioeconomic characteristics. Second, they focus on teenagers co-residing with
their parents to examine the effect of family background on their relative schooling success.
However, this second approach needs to be restricted to young children given that adults who
co-reside with their parents are not representative of their peers, which would lead to a biased
sample (Torche, 2014).
The most common tool to measure intergenerational mobility is the slope coefficient from
a linear regression of children’s on parent’s outcome. This slope (usually called beta) can be
standardized in order to take into account differences within the two distributions, which yields
to a correlation coefficient (Neidho¨fer et al., 2017).
Another way to describe intergenerational mobility is the use of transitional matrices. “The
intergenerational transition matrix is a table whose i jth entry is the fraction of children whose
9Torche (2014) makes a review of the available mobility surveys in Latin America by country.
10See for example Cuesta et al. (2011); Orden˜ana & Arteaga (2012)
16
parent or parents earned income level i, and who in turn earn income level j. The implicit
social goal is to achieve a transition matrix whose rows are identical” (Romer, 2004, p. 50).
One of the most recent studies that presents a transition matrix for Latin America is Neidho¨fer
et al. (2017), and it shows a substantial persistence of education across generations. According
to this, 55.2% of children with low education come from parents with low education as well.
Similarly, 57.9% of those with high educational attainment are the offspring of parents with a
high level of education.
Azevedo & Bouillon (2010) review the evidence on intergenerational social mobility in
Latin America. Results indicate that mobility is low in the region, even when compared with
the United States11 and United Kingdom, which rank low on social mobility. There also seems
to exist lower levels of mobility at the top and bottom of the income distribution. Regarding
educational mobility, the levels are still low, although there has been an improvement in recent
decades. The literature reviewed in this paper suggests that the overall low mobility in the
region might be associated with social exclusion, low access to higher education, and labor
market discrimination.
A more recent review is Torche (2014). He starts from the first generation of class mobility
research in Latin America (1960’s), which was entirely conducted by sociologists. The review
then gets into the second generation (1990s), where economic mobility questions are assessed.
The studies show a low mobility for the region, and there is evidence of stronger persistence at
the top than at the bottom in every country. For example, “in Brazil, 35% of those with origins
in the poorest quintile remain poor, whereas 43% of those with origins in the wealthiest quintile
remain wealthy” (Ferreira & J., 2006).
As exemplified by these two reviews, Latin America presents low levels of mobility, which
are consistent with the high levels of inequality in the region.12 In fact, Hertz et al. (2007)
estimates 50-year trends in the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment for a
11Behrman et al. (2001) include the United States on their study to compare it with Latin America’s intergener-
ational mobility.
12Studies about the Great Gatsby curve in Latin America show a negative relationship between inequality and
social mobility. See for example Neidho¨fer (2016).
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sample of 42 nations around the globe, and the seven Latin American countries included in the
sample yield the lowest mobility levels of all.
Some literature has also examined the relation between macroeconomic conditions and in-
tergenerational mobility in the region. Behrman et al. (2000) found that better developed mar-
kets –in particular financial markets– increase social mobility. According to their results, higher
spending per school-aged child on primary education, and better quality primary and secondary
schooling are positively associated with intergenerational mobility, while relatively greater pub-
lic spending on tertiary education may actually reduce intergenerational mobility.13 Similarly,
Neidho¨fer (2016) found that economic growth is one of the main channels behind the relation-
ship between inequality and intergenerational mobility in Latin America, while public expendi-
tures on education is a contrasting force. I.e., ”(private and public) investment in human capital
is determinant for intergenerational mobility, and a strongly dispersed distribution of this feature
seriously challenges equality of opportunity in a society” (Neidho¨fer, 2016, p. 24).
So far, the discussion has focused on estimates regarding population averages. However,
as Couch & Lilalrd (2001) note, a natural extension of the intergenerational mobility literature
has been to examine the relationship between the socioeconomic status of parents and their
offspring’s across the distribution of earnings. With this purpose, several studies have presented
transition matrices, kernel density and quantile regression techniques.14 All the papers found
that intergenerational mobility varies across the distribution of earnings.
The approach used in this paper is quantile regression, a methodology that has been used
mostly on developed countries. Grawe (2001) compares intergenerational mobility in the United
States with other developed countries using quantile regression, as well as with four developing
nations, where Ecuador and Peru are included. He concludes that while industrialized countries
might be similar between them, income mobility in developing countries may be much slower.
Here, Peru presents lower mobility estimates for the bottom quantiles, while in Ecuador the
opposite happens.
13Consistent results are found by Dahan & Gaviria (2001).
14For transition matrices see Corak & Heisz (1999); Couch & Lilalrd (1998). For kernel density see Corak &
Heisz (1999). For quantile regression examples see Eide & Showalter (1999); Grawe (2004).
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There is not much research on Latin America’s intergenerational mobility using quantile
regression. However, as mentioned before, Neidho¨fer et al. (2017) used a transitional ma-
trix, which shows that educational persistence at the top of the distribution is high and has not
changed substantially over time. Similarly, Behrman et al. (2001) compute mobility matrices
for Brazil and Colombia (the two least mobile countries in their sample), but they found that
the proportion of upward mobile children from the bottom of the distribution is substantially
higher than the proportion of downward mobile children from the top. Nevertheless, this last
research is conditional on the parents’ socioeconomic category, while quantile regression allows
for distinctions in the children’s status.
As Grawe (2004) states, quantile regression is far more than simply a descriptive statistic.
Furthermore, Bhattacharya & Mazumder (2007) criticize the standard transition matrices ap-
proach for relying on arbitrary discretizations of the distribution (Black & Devereux, 2011). It
seems that quantile regression might be the best way to capture the notion of equal opportunity:
“we should examine the group of individuals who reach the pith centile conditional
on their circumstance type. A just society will redistribute resources between cir-
cumstance types so as to maximize the utility of the least fortunate member of this
group” (Grawe, 2001, p. 3).
The study by Navarro (2007) on intragenerational mobility in Argentina uses a quantile re-
gression approach. The main result is that individual’s past income is a more important explana-
tory variable for current individual’s incomes at the middle and the bottom of the conditional
income distribution than at the top. Andrade et al. (2003) compute a quantile regression in
order to test the effect of borrowing constraints on intergenerational mobility in Brazil. They
found that the degree of intergenerational persistence is greater for the upper quantiles, which is
consistent with the presence of borrowing constraints affecting the degree of intergenerational
persistence.
We can see that the literature on intergenerational mobility in Latin America is expanding,
as well as the available data.15 As explained before, this is a way of measuring equality of
15There is a new harmonized database built from household surveys by Neidhofer, Gasparini and Serrano. See
(Neidho¨fer et al., 2017) for more information.
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opportunity in a society. Therefore, given the socioeconomic context of the region, the results
can have important implications for public policy aimed at leveling the playing field. However,
as Torche (2014) points out, it is not a perfect indicator. “Some mechanisms for the intergen-
erational persistence —for example, genetic inheritance or family socialization— would exist
even in a society in which institutions fully compensated for socioeconomic disadvantages”
(Torche, 2014, p. 624). In addition, when comparing mobility levels across countries, it is im-
portant to mention that the assumption made is that genetic inheritance and family socialization
do not have a great variation across nations (Torche, 2014), which seems to be a reasonable
assumption, especially at the regional level.
2.4 Intergenerational Education Mobility
The final objective when studying social mobility is to determine how family background affects
the socioeconomic status of children, whose most accurate quantifier is income. However, as
mentioned above, in this research the dependent variable is educational attainment.
There are three main reasons to focus on schooling instead of income of the offspring.
First, in Latin America there is more availability of data on education across generations than
on income. Second, education is more comparable across generations than earnings. Third, as
emphasized by the literature about returns to education, it is a key determinant of wage earnings.
Thus, differences in educational attainment are important to understand static income inequality
(Daude & Robano, 2015). In addition, Neidho¨fer et al. (2017) show how educational attainment
is related to economic well-being: in every country, for both cohorts analyzed, there is a clear
positive association between average income and educational categories.
A particularly important concern is how intergenerational education mobility would trans-
late into earnings mobility. For this, and due to the lack of intergenerational income data,
most of the studies have focused on pathway transmissions (Dunn, 2007).16 In fact, Dunn
(2007) found that education is the most significant pathway by which earnings are transmitted
in Brazil: when educational outcomes were less dependent on birth status, earnings equality of
opportunity soon followed.
16Dunn (2007) explains theoretically the transmission of earnings through education.
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“Hence, a society that is not displaying substantial mobility in education across
generations is unlikely to have a great deal of intergenerational income mobility,
unless markets work in a very inefficient manner (for example, by not rewarding
education)” (Ferreira et al., 2013, p. 52).17
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Source of Data
The source of data for this research is the annual opinion survey Latinobarometro (Latino-
barometro, 2017). It records individual and household characteristics of a nationally represen-
tative sample of adult respondents in 18 Latin American countries since 1995.18 The sample
per country is of 1000 to 1200 individuals, and around 20.000 persons are surveyed each year,
representing more than 600 million inhabitants of the region. “The representativeness of the
survey has varied over time reaching 100% of the total population in all countries around the
year 2000” (Neidho¨fer et al., 2017, p. 4). Latinobarometro Corporation, a non-profit NGO
based in Santiago (Chile), is solely responsible for the production and publication of the data. It
analyzes the development of democracy and economies as well as societies through indicators
of opinion, attitudes, behaviour and values.19
Neidho¨fer et al. (2017) mention the pros and cons of Latinobarometro with respect to the
harmonized household database that they present. Latinobarometro’s speficic objective is to
make cross-country studies, for which it is harmonized ex-ante. It also includes 18 countries,
in comparison to nine for the new database, given that not all household surveys include retro-
spective questions. On the other hand, the main advantage of National Household Surveys is
that they offer a substantially higher number of observations. Their study, however, shows that
results from both datasets are very similar and thus we are confident about the validity of the
results.
17As noted before, Latin America has substantially high returns to education.
18Domican Republic is in the sample only since 2004. It is carried out by local firms in each country under the
supervision of the Latinobarometro Corporation.
19See www.latinobarometro.org.
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3.2 Restriction Criteria
To conduct the empirical analysis we restricted the sample along various dimensions, which are
explained next.
The main restriction criterion was the availability of the retrospective questions on both,
parental education and income.20 Then, the sample was restricted to those who were 25 years
old or older, given that this is the age when usually a person has finished her studies (Barro
& Lee, 1993).Some literature tends to use a lower bound of 23 instead of 25. A comparative
analysis was made between the distribution of education when age is equal to 23, 24 and 25.
The same was computed for age greater than 23, 24 and 25. For most of the years, when age
is equal to 25, the upper tail of the distribution has more density. Therefore, the age of 25 was
maintained as a lower bound.
In order to drop those years that present a biased level of educational attainment, the average
of this variable, by country and year, was compared to the one reported by Barro & Lee (2016).21
The years of 2000 and 2004 were dropped because they have a significantly high upward bias
in most of the countries.22
Regarding missing values, there are three years (2009, 2010 and 2013) in which parental
education is not reported for about 20% of the sample. To make sure that these values are
randomly distributed, we compared the average educational attainment, per year and country,
with those individuals for whom parental education is not reported. In every year, when the
missing values are removed, the mean educational attainment increases, which means that the
missing values are mostly for people with lower education. Given this directional change,
the mobility estimations of this paper could be considered as an upper bound.23 However, the
20Self-reported income, as well as parental income, is expressed in deciles.
21The comparison was made for people between 25 and 64 years old given that Barro Lee report educational
attainment for this age range.
22We also considered the possibility of dropping certain countries, specifically Colombia and Venezuela, because
not only they differ significantly from Barro Lee’s mean educational attainment in almost every year, but also
because they report a higher average level of education than Chile, which is not close to reality. Given that Chile
is the country in the region with the highest levels of education, it was taken as a benchmark to check that the
educational attainment of the sample made sense. However, when the models were estimated without these two
countries, the coefficients did not present a significant variation.
23The reason is, as shown later, that those with lower levels of education present less mobility, so when they are
removed because of missing values, the mobility is overestimated.
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maximum variation at the mean is around 0.18 years of schooling, which means that the missing
values do no create a significant bias.
For the variables of educational attainment, both for children and parents, after 12 years of
education, the categories reported by Latinobarometro are the following: incomplete university,
completed university, and incomplete technical. These last two categories were recoded to 16
and 13 years of education respectively. Nevertheless, incomplete university could mean either
13, 14 or 15 years of schooling. To address this issue, for those individuals in this category, one
of the three possible educational attainments was randomly assigned.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics of educational attainment per country and year. There
are clear differences across countries. Those with higher income, for example Argentina and
Chile, present higher levels of education, while poorer countries like Guatemala, Nicaragua and
Honduras have the lowest levels of all the region. In addition, throughout the period, in every
country except Uruguay, the educational levels have grown: the average increase from 2006
and 2013 is of almost one year of education, where Ecuador presents the highest rise of about 3
years. Table 2 shows the average parental educational attainment. When comparing these two
tables, we can see that there has been an increase of about 3 years of education, in the region
as a whole, from one generation to the next one. This intergenerational rise took place in every
country, where Guatemala had the lowest and Venezuela the highest change.
Table 3 shows that at median levels parental education did not even reach complete primary
education, while the offspring’s median is 8 years. In addition, percentiles 25 and 75 hold
the highest educational attainment increase from parents to children (5 years). When looking
only at children’s education, we can tell that over the period, the highest change occurs in the
percentile 25 and the median.
The increase of educational attainment from parents to children is consistent with the up-
ward absolute mobility that Table 4 shows: over the whole period, 66.31% of children have
overpassed the educational level of their parents, but there still exists 11.58% of children who
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Table 1: Mean Educational Attainment per country and per year
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Argentina
9.08 10.01 10.04 9.92 10.06 10.19 10.22 9.93
(3.95) (3.69) (3.66) (3.65) (3.64) (3.46) (3.42) (3.66)
Bolivia 7.15 7.30 7.47 7.39 7.32 7.47 7.86 7.42(5.17) (5.20) (5.11) (5.08) (5.11) (5.11) (5.26) (5.15)
Brazil 6.44 6.64 7.09 7.04 7.37 7.35 7.82 7.12(4.42) (4.74) (4.78) (4.75) (4.80) (4.85) (4.88) (4.77)
Chile 9.79 9.76 10.23 10.06 10.62 10.93 10.86 10.32(4.00) (4.00) (4.03) (3.97) (3.48) (3.46) (3.53) (3.82)
Colombia 8.71 8.40 8.63 7.23 10.49 10.82 11.21 9.36(4.52) (4.61) (4.89) (4.72) (4.35) (4.16) (4.08) (4.69)
Costa Rica 7.47 7.49 7.47 7.58 7.88 7.38 7.89 7.59(4.33) (4.41) (4.33) (4.33) (4.29) (4.32) (4.45) (4.35)
Dom. Rep. 7.24 7.41 7.50 7.67 7.50 7.64 7.64 7.52(4.72) (4.61) (4.66) (4.86) (4.89) (4.97) (5.03) (4.82)
Ecuador 7.72 7.55 7.44 7.54 7.96 8.00 10.85 8.16(4.79) (4.72) (4.66) (4.66) (4.78) (4.61) (3.98) (4.74)
El Salvador 5.89 6.24 6.22 6.27 6.08 6.30 6.06 6.15(4.96) (4.93) (4.99) (4.97) (4.95) (4.95) (4.81) (4.94)
Guatemala 3.65 3.24 4.00 4.16 4.07 4.06 4.35 3.94(4.07) (3.53) (4.44) (4.41) (4.60) (4.34) (4.69) (4.33)
Honduras 4.85 5.61 5.77 5.18 5.31 5.27 5.32 5.33(4.31) (4.31) (4.05) (4.30) (4.40) (4.38) (4.24) (4.29)
Mexico 7.71 7.96 8.19 7.81 7.71 8.04 7.88 7.90(4.80) (4.73) (4.87) (4.60) (4.57) (4.53) (4.45) (4.65)
Nicaragua 4.97 4.70 5.22 5.38 5.57 5.42 5.21 5.21(4.45) (4.29) (4.81) (4.74) (4.79) (4.80) (4.65) (4.66)
Panama 8.30 8.15 7.55 7.94 8.13 8.47 9.38 8.28(4.68) (4.38) (4.74) (4.78) (4.57) (4.58) (4.60) (4.65)
Paraguay 7.68 8.40 8.17 7.92 8.70 8.55 8.87 8.33(4.31) (4.19) (4.20) (4.01) (4.35) (4.21) (3.65) (4.16)
Peru 8.83 8.83 8.53 9.39 9.33 9.34 9.48 9.11(4.93) (5.02) (5.01) (4.95) (4.91) (5.00) (5.00) (4.98)
Uruguay 8.99 9.39 8.47 8.60 9.16 9.24 8.89 8.96(3.84) (4.07) (3.76) (3.61) (4.00) (3.81) (3.64) (3.83)
Venezuela 8.60 8.91 10.28 9.95 9.83 9.78 10.36 9.67(4.32) (4.29) (4.13) (3.62) (4.21) (3.98) (3.65) (4.08)
Total 7.55 7.72 7.83 7.75 8.11 8.19 8.53 7.96(4.75) (4.75) (4.79) (4.72) (4.81) (4.77) (4.75) (4.77)
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: Latinobarometro.
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Table 2: Mean Parental Educational Attainment per country and per year
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Argentina
6.37 7.28 6.97 7.12 7.43 7.18 7.44 7.10
(3.97) (4.11) (4.10) (4.06) (4.23) (4.15) (3.9) (4.09)
Bolivia 3.94 4.08 4.10 3.96 3.87 3.92 4.01 3.98(4.74) (5.34) (4.95) (4.87) (4.78) (5.18) (4.88) (4.96)
Brazil 3.78 3.56 3.47 3.68 3.60 3.96 4.20 3.76(3.94) (4.05) (3.95) (4.17) (4.01) (4.07) (4.25) (4.07)
Chile 7.08 7.06 7.70 7.29 7.77 8.42 7.83 7.60(4.65) (4.71) (4.49) (4.69) (4.52) (4.42) (4.50) (4.59)
Colombia 4.75 4.48 4.49 4.10 6.30 7.36 7.16 5.55(4.35) (4.23) (4.25) (4.49) (5.26) (4.67) (4.99) (4.79)
Costa Rica 5.22 5.17 4.41 5.06 5.46 5.13 5.48 5.13(4.66) (4.39) (3.96) (4.48) (4.66) (4.43) (4.75) (4.49)
Dom. Rep. 4.91 4.04 4.62 4.84 3.69 4.40 4.89 4.47(4.37) (4.79) (4.63) (5.01) (4.65) (4.91) (5.53) (4.88)
Ecuador 4.58 4.50 4.72 4.41 5.12 5.20 6.88 5.06(4.40) (4.23) (4.35) (4.25) (4.34) (4.23) (4.16) (4.35)
El Salvador 2.54 3.20 2.16 1.83 3.03 2.98 3.20 2.68(4.28) (4.53) (3.91) (3.63) (4.36) (4.17) (4.28) (4.19)
Guatemala 3.80 1.97 1.98 2.02 2.16 2.10 2.61 2.38(4.35) (3.23) (3.55) (3.51) (3.58) (3.37) (3.87) (3.71)
Honduras 2.41 2.63 2.30 2.31 3.19 3.36 3.35 2.80(3.85) (3.61) (3.53) (3.60) (3.92) (3.94) (4.12) (3.82)
Mexico 3.86 4.13 4.39 4.09 4.14 3.99 4.15 4.11(4.39) (4.41) (4.70) (4.30) (4.41) (4.31) (4.56) (4.44)
Nicaragua 2.58 3.07 2.97 3.27 3.31 3.00 2.46 2.97(4.21) (4.39) (4.27) (4.50) (4.55) (4.46) (3.96) (4.35)
Panama 5.24 4.97 3.65 4.53 5.66 6.14 6.26 5.19(4.73) (4.75) (4.57) (4.66) (4.73) (4.95) (5.21) (4.88)
Paraguay 4.62 5.16 5.46 4.54 5.52 4.63 4.13 4.84(3.77) (4.19) (4.00) (3.60) (3.94) (4.04) (2.55) (3.78)
Peru 5.51 5.87 5.50 6.21 5.97 6.20 6.55 5.97(5.12) (5.17) (5.19) (5.19) (4.96) (5.06) (5.05) (5.12)
Uruguay 6.78 6.55 6.23 6.48 6.45 6.78 6.91 6.60(3.91) (4.17) (3.52) (3.72) (3.76) (4.01) (3.83) (3.86)
Venezuela 4.98 4.93 6.75 3.70 5.49 7.38 6.33 5.59(4.30) (4.47) (4.62) (2.58) (4.75) (3.87) (4.2) (4.34)
Total 4.71 4.72 4.67 4.49 5.02 5.21 5.35 4.88(4.53) (4.63) (4.59) (4.50) (4.69) (4.71) (4.70) (4.63)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Source: Latinobarometro
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Table 3: Mean and Percentiles of Children and Parental Educational Attainment
Educational Attainment (Mean and Percentiles)
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
mean 7.55 7.72 7.83 7.75 8.11 8.19 8.53 7.96
p10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
p25 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 5
median 7 7 8 7 8 8 9 8
p75 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
p90 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Parental Educational Attainment (Mean and Percentiles)
Year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
mean 4.71 4.72 4.67 4.49 5.02 5.21 5.35 4.88
p10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
median 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 5
p75 7 7 7 6 8 8 8 7
p90 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Source: Latinobarometro.
Table 4: Absolute Mobility in Latin America
More Same Less
2006 65.85% 20.99% 13.16%
2007 66.48% 21.72% 11.80%
2008 67.02% 22.07% 10.91%
2009 67.16% 21.79% 11.04%
2010 65.55% 22.95% 11.49%
2011 65.34% 23.19% 11.47%
2013 66.72% 22.10% 11.17%
Total 66.31% 22.12% 11.58%
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: Latinobarometro.
got less years of education. Although there is no clear trend year by year, if we only look at
2006 and 2013, the percentage of children who have more education than their parents does
increase, while those who have less decreased.
4 Methodology
This section describes the econometric techniques used to measure educational intergenera-
tional mobility in Latin America. Beta-coefficients were computed in different regression mod-
els, using both OLS and Quantile Regression. The models can be distinguished by two main
considerations: linearity of the main regressor (parental education), and the inclusion of con-
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trols. At the same time, models with controls can be divided into two: with identity controls
and with no identity controls.24
The linearity distinction emerged from the possibility of different effects on educational
attainment, depending on which part of the distribution of parental education (PE) we look
at. On the other hand, the inclusion of controls goes along with the extension of a traditional
bivariate focus by considering diverse dimensions of social origins, i.e. circumstances, such as
gender or identity (Torche, 2014).
4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
As noted before, the most common tool to measure intergenerational mobility is the beta-
coefficient from a linear regression of children’s on parent’s outcome. We regress the edu-
cational attainment (E) of child i from country j in year k on the years of education of the parent
with the highest educational attainment (PE). The OLS model is the following:
Ei jk = α+β jkPEi jk + γ jkXi jk + εi jk, (1)
where α is a constant, X is the vector of control variables, and ε is the error term. The vec-
tor X includes self-reported parental income decile (PI), gender and identity controls.25 The
beta-coefficient reflects how a child’s final education is associated with parental educational
attainment. A larger beta-coefficient implies less mobility given that there is more educational
persistence across generations.
When non-linearity of parental education is considered, the estimation becomes:
Ei jk = α+β jkPEi jk +δ jkPE2i jk + γ jkXi jk + εi jk (2)
24The reason why we make this distinction is that in 2006, Latinobarometro did not include questions about
identity. So in order to keep this year in the period of analysis, we computed models with and without identity
controls.
25The omitted category for identity controls is mestizo.
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A cubic term for parental education and a quadratic one for parental income decile were
also considered. But through a variance inflation factor analysis, they were dropped given
multicolineality.
Equations (1) and (2) were estimated per country and per year, and also for the full sample.
Neidho¨fer et al. (2017); Daude (2011); Daude & Robano (2015) are recent studies that compute
similar estimations for the region. The major contributions of this paper are the period of study,
the inclusion, or validation, of a non-linear parental education term, and the quantile regression
analysis, which we explain next.
4.2 Quantile Regression (QR)
This methodology complements the classical OLS estimation, which is conditional on the mean,
by estimating different beta-coefficients along the distribution of the dependent variable. In this
way we can obtain different effects of PE on the median of educational attainment, on the 10th
percentile, on the 20th percentile, etc. Therefore, QR allows us to explore nonlinearities in the
dependent variable. As noted in the literature review, transitional matrices have been probably
the most common way to address this non-linearity issues.
The quantile regression analysis was proposed by Koenker & Basset (1978), and ever since
it has been widely used in economic research. As Navarro (2007) notes, this approach has
many advantages. First, based on Buchinsky (1998), the “quantile regression model assumes
that covariates may not only shift the location or the scale of the conditional distribution, but
also could affect the shape of the distribution as well” (Navarro, 2007, p. 4). Second, given that
QR is based on a weighted sum of absolute deviations, the estimated betas are not sensitive to
outliers of the dependent variable. Thirdly, the OLS estimation is efficient and unbiased when
the error term follows a normal distribution, but in the case of heteroskedacity a QR approach
seems to be more accurate given that the error term will have less variation per quantile of the
dependent variable.26
26In fact, heteroskedacity was found using a Breusch-Pagan test.
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Koenker & Basset (1978) show that quantiles can be estimated as a solution of a minimiza-
tion problem. What is to be minimized in order to estimate the θth quantile is the weighted
absolute sum of deviations:
qθ = argminc = E[ρθ (Y − c)], (3)
where ρθ represents the weights, and (1−θ) is assigned to the negative deviations, while θ is
assigned to the positive ones. Y is the dependent variable, and c is the center of the distribution
that minimizes the squared sum of deviations (Davino et al., 2014). In this sense, Equation (3)
for a continuous variable becomes:
qθ = argminc
(
(1−θ)
∫ c
−∞
|y− c| f (y)dy+θ
∫ −∞
c
|y− c| f (y)dy
)
, (4)
In the regression setting, interpreting Y as a response variable and X as a set of predictor vari-
ables, the unconditional mean as a minimizer can be extended to the estimation of the condi-
tional mean function:
µˆ(xi,β ) = argminµE[Y −µ(xi,β )]2 (5)
Therefore, for the generic θth quantile:
qˆY (θ ,X) = argminQY (θ ,X)E[ρθ (Y −QY (θ ,X))], (6)
where QY (θ ,X) = Qθ [Y |X = x] represents the generic conditional quantile function. Similarly,
the estimated beta for the θth is given by:
βˆ (θ) = argminβE[ρθ (Y −Xβ )] (7)
According to Koenker (2005), the quantile regression problem can be formulated as a linear
programming method, and it is assumed to be solved by a finite number of simplex iterations.
This way, the robustness of the quantile regression estimator is guaranteed. As long as the
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residual sign is not altered, varying the magnitude of the response variable will not change the
solutions (Navarro, 2007).
Applying quantile regression to Equations (1) and (2), we obtain the following estimation
models:
Eik,θ = α(θ)+βk(θ)PEik + γk(θ)Xik + εik(θ), θ ∈ [0,1] (8)
Eik,θ = α(θ)+βk(θ)PEik +δk(θ)PE2ik + γk(θ)Xik + εik(θ), θ ∈ [0,1] (9)
The subindex j is removed here because the quantile regression was estimated only for the entire
region per year. In this sense, the set of Eik,θ estimates the educational attainment distribution
for Latin America in year k.
5 Empirical Results
The transitional matrices presented in Table 5 provide a good insight into how parental back-
ground is related to the educational attainment of children when we include non-linearities.27
The first two categories together (0-3 and 4-6) represent people who have up to primary educa-
tion28, the third one is for those who have from 7 years of education up to finished high school,
and the last one is for those with some, or complete, higher education. The first panel is a de-
scription of the conditional probabilities for the parent to have a certain educational attainment
y given the child’s years of education x:
P(PE = y|E = x) = P(PE = y,E = x)
P(E = x)
(10)
We can see that the highest conditional probability, with a significant difference from the others,
is to have parents at the lowest range of education given that children are located at the bottom
category as well. This suggests very low mobility at the bottom of the distribution of E.
27The transitional matrices were computed for every year, but only the total of the period is presented given that
the structure did not vary significantly between years.
28They were divided into two because almost 80% of PE observations are located within 0 to 6 years of educa-
tion.
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Table 5: Education Transitional Matrices for Latin America from 2006 to 2013
Conditional probability of PE given E
E\PE 0-3 4-6 7-12 13-16
0-3 86.73% 10.02% 2.86% 0.39%
4-6 58.19% 33.98% 6.76% 1.06%
7-12 29.06% 35.16% 31.10% 4.68%
13-16 13.32% 25.61% 37.97% 23.09%
Conditional probability of E given PE
E\PE 0-3 4-6 7-12 13-16
0-3 38.16% 6.93% 2.64% 1.16%
4-6 31.63% 29.04% 7.71% 3.90%
7-12 24.35% 46.33% 54.64% 26.43%
13-16 5.86% 17.71% 35.01% 68.51%
Source: Latinobarometro.
The second panel gives us some more information about how parental background might
affect the educational outcome of the offspring. It shows the conditional probability for children
to be at a specific educational attainment range given the parental years of education:
P(E = x|PE = y) = P(E = x,PE = y)
P(PE = y)
(11)
Contrary to the first transitional matrix, here the highest probability is located at the top of both
distributions: 68.51% of the children from parents at the highest range of education are located
in this category as well, while only 5.86% of children whose parents are at the bottom reached
this range of educational attainment.
In the first (second) matrix, the closer we move towards the top of the distribution of children
(parental) educational attainment, the more likely it is to have parents (children) with higher
education. This suggests that the relationship between these two outcomes is not linear in
any of the two distributions. Appendix 1 explains separately the variations from the linear
model towards the non-linearities, both on the independent variable (adding squared parental
education) and on the dependent variable (computing the quantile regression with linear parental
education).
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5.1 OLS Estimations
In Table 6, we present the estimates for Eq. (2) per country and per year. The last column
shows the estimations for each country for the whole period, whereas the last row presents the
estimates per year for all the countries together. Therefore, the quadrant at the lower right end
of the table is the OLS estimation for the region in the period of 2007-2013.
The squared term of parental education (PE) is significant and negative, which yields a
convex relationship. The negative effect is typically around 20 years of PE, which is outside
of the considered range in the sample. It makes sense that parental education does not have a
negative effect on the child’s education, but that it does depend on the part of the distribution. As
the education of the parents increases, its marginal effect on their children’s education decreases.
In terms of beta-coefficients, given that parental education is not linear, it is better to look
at marginal effects, which are computed at the average parental education depending on the
year and country. These results are shown in Table 7. El Salvador and Costa Rica are the
countries with the lowest and highest mobility, respectively. Although these results are not
directly comparable with linear studies about educational intergenerational mobility in Latin
America, the estimations seem to be consistent with the ranking of countries according to their
mobility degrees. In general, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay are ranked as the most mobile
countries of the region (Azevedo & Bouillon, 2010), and in Table 7 they also have relatively
low beta-coefficients. The results on Neidho¨fer et al. (2017) also rank Costa Rica as one of the
countries with more mobility.
Additionally, we can see that mobility in the region has increased over the period of analysis.
The marginal effect of parental education on children’s education went from 0.688 in 2007 to
0.571 in 2013.29. This result goes along with the evidence on The Great Gatsby Curve given that
inequality in the region has significantly decreased during the commodities boom. Although
The Great Gatsby Curve refers to the relationship between inequality and income mobility, as
explained before, educational mobility can eventually translate into income mobility.
29Neidho¨fer (2016) founds an increase of mobility over time through a cohorts analysis
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Table 6: Non-Linear OLS Estimations for Latin America from 2007 to 2013
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Argentina
PE 0.666*** 0.520*** 0.539*** 0.558*** 0.574*** 0.661*** 0.587***
(0.087) (0.098) (0.099) (0.082) (0.087) (0.099) (0.037)
PEs -0.013** -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010* -0.014** -0.009***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
PI 0.181*** 0.257*** 0.268*** 0.171*** 0.047 0.239*** 0.198***
(0.055) (0.064) (0.062) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.024)
male 0.139 -0.276 0.035 -0.371* -0.449** -0.461** -0.221***
(0.206) (0.223) (0.219) (0.203) -0.204 (0.204) (0.086)
ind 1.764 0.199 1.534** 1.464 -1.121 0.277 0.547
(1.190) (1.016) (0.723) (1.134) (0.835) (0.561) (0.390)
black -0.792 -2.251*** -1.189 -3.014*** 1.051 6.017*** -0.938
(0.923) (0.765) (1.378) (0.530) (0.941) (0.481) (0.672)
white 0.335 0.793*** 0.635*** 0.803*** -0.064 0.048 0.392***
(0.276) (0.297) (0.245) (0.276) (0.235) (0.264) (0.108)
other -0.612 0.408 0.164 0.427 0.813 0.268 0.163
(0.455) (0.626) (0.659) (1.014) (0.499) (0.656) (0.256)
Bolivia
PE 0.933*** 0.919*** 1.095*** 1.034*** 0.725*** 0.929*** 0.954***
(0.089) (0.104) (0.087) (0.103) (0.117) (0.107) (0.040)
PEs -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.030***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
PI 0.123* 0.386*** 0.161** 0.290*** 0.305*** 0.474*** 0.285***
(0.070) (0.094) (0.077) (0.089) (0.091) (0.092) (0.034)
male 1.244*** 0.991*** 1.240*** 1.143*** 0.656** 1.127*** 1.082***
(0.265) (0.291) (0.257) (0.291) (0.328) (0.317) (0.118)
ind -1.969*** -1.722*** -1.924*** -2.065*** -2.376*** -1.041*** -1.851***
(0.319) (0.342) (0.303) (0.340) (0.398) (0.368) (0.140)
black 2.716*** -1.701 -1.672 -2.700 3.667*** 0.377 -0.056
(0.429) (2.017) (1.689) (2.563) (0.706) (0.952) (0.915)
white 0.866 -1.304 0.516 -0.408 0.978 -1.125 0.003
(0.541) (0.850) (0.685) (0.666) (0.858) (1.202) (0.310)
other -1.488** -0.992 -2.336*** 1.416 0.162 0.085 -0.820*
(0.642) (1.511) (0.784) (0.865) (1.175) (1.440) (0.474)
Brazil
PE 0.898*** 1.143*** 1.036*** 1.044*** 0.984*** 1.167*** 1.054***
(0.093) (0.092) (0.091) (0.084) (0.089) (0.092) (0.037)
PEs -0.022*** -0.041*** -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.035***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
PI 0.100 0.096 0.237*** 0.183*** 0.204*** 0.094 0.150***
(0.066) (0.071) (0.065) (0.066) (0.073) (0.068) (0.028)
male -0.428 -0.337 -0.531** -0.444* -0.196 -0.335 -0.381***
(0.276) (0.276) (0.268) (0.253) (0.262) (0.267) (0.109)
ind -1.262 0.484 -0.681 -0.011 -1.538* 0.396 -0.389
(0.859) (0.978) (0.915) (0.671) (0.857) (0.826) (0.368)
black -0.178 0.132 0.162 -0.053 -0.645 0.510 -0.027
(0.499) (0.461) (0.436) (0.449) (0.435) (0.484) (0.187)
white -0.203 0.940*** 0.005 0.736** 1.305*** 0.988*** 0.627***
(0.415) (0.344) (0.337) (0.356) (0.368) (0.359) (0.147)
other -1.063** -0.016 -0.827* -0.804** -0.054 0.499 -0.413**
(0.465) (0.463) (0.452) (0.405) (0.481) (0.415) (0.179)
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Chile
PE 0.717*** 0.827*** 0.735*** 0.640*** 0.505*** 0.608*** 0.680***
(0.075) (0.087) (0.087) (0.074) (0.074) (0.084) (0.033)
PEs -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.002 -0.010** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
PI 0.258*** 0.253*** 0.332*** 0.272*** 0.137** 0.240*** 0.247***
(0.066) (0.063) (0.068) (0.058) (0.054) (0.060) (0.026)
male 0.466** 0.608*** 0.340 0.351** 0.514*** 0.074 0.388***
(0.209) (0.192) (0.209) (0.175) (0.164) (0.182) (0.077)
ind -0.025 -0.053 -0.680 -0.967** -0.422 -0.883* -0.492***
(0.390) (0.435) (0.509) (0.375) (0.345) (0.457) (0.168)
black -1.508*** -2.866*** -6.026*** 2.031 -0.693*** 2.961*** -0.744
(0.513) (0.640) (0.263) (1.269) (0.217) (0.583) (0.811)
white -0.197 -0.389 0.029 -0.062 0.132 -0.108 -0.087
(0.222) (0.250) (0.222) (0.218) (0.193) (0.194) (0.087)
other -0.571 -1.142*** 0.868* -0.445 -0.351 -0.642 -0.346
(0.765) (0.381) (0.500) (0.696) (0.576) (0.781) (0.278)
Colombia
PE 0.925*** 1.061*** 0.842*** 0.463*** 0.475*** 0.379*** 0.730***
(0.085) (0.110) (0.093) (0.076) (0.089) (0.078) (0.036)
PEs -0.029*** -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.017***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
PI 0.221*** 0.354*** 0.106 0.375*** 0.417*** 0.395*** 0.249***
(0.062) (0.081) (0.072) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.028)
male 0.481* -0.425 -0.009 0.699*** -0.034 -0.248 0.072
(0.263) (0.334) (0.304) (0.255) (0.237) (0.237) (0.114)
ind -2.229*** -0.708 -1.085* -0.393 -1.020* -0.414 -1.028***
(0.580) (0.598) (0.608) (0.581) (0.520) (0.649) (0.256)
black -0.398 -0.547 -0.512 -0.916 -1.277** -0.406 -0.775***
(0.548) (0.603) (0.641) (0.628) (0.630) (0.531) (0.251)
white -0.608** -0.460 -0.032 -0.276 -0.433 -0.698** -0.571***
(0.290) (0.361) (0.344) (0.287) (0.269) (0.286) (0.128)
other 0.002 -0.851 0.622 0.286 -0.418 -0.089 -0.190
(0.649) (0.684) (0.579) (0.483) (0.438) (0.510) (0.241)
Costa Rica
PE 0.384*** 0.253** 0.262*** 0.197** 0.623*** -0.029 0.290***
(0.103) (0.106) (0.095) (0.093) (0.098) (0.112) (0.041)
PEs -0.001 0.008 0.005 0.014** -0.009 0.025*** 0.007**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003)
PI 0.193** 0.212** 0.293*** 0.194** 0.153** 0.082 0.195***
(0.075) (0.088) (0.082) (0.077) (0.075) (0.100) (0.033)
male -0.131 0.406 0.834*** 0.542* 0.295 -0.229 0.311**
(0.347) (0.352) (0.318) (0.320) (0.317) (0.366) (0.138)
ind -1.226 -2.855*** -0.879 1.263 1.538 -0.238 -0.196
(0.844) (1.103) (0.810) (1.567) (1.011) (1.149) (0.424)
black -0.825 0.733 0.072 2.615** 0.971 -0.935 0.607
(1.615) (2.158) (1.316) (1.012) (0.966) (1.213) (0.537)
white -0.586 0.076 0.032 0.575 0.320 0.053 0.086
(0.398) (0.388) (0.370) (0.353) (0.375) (0.425) (0.158)
other -0.202 -0.278 -0.336 -0.028 -0.606 -0.781 -0.402*
(0.555) (0.549) (0.491) (0.482) (0.439) (0.592) (0.212)
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Dominican Republic
PE 0.776*** 1.111*** 0.866*** 0.651*** 0.853*** 0.429*** 0.765***
(0.099) (0.110) (0.107) (0.106) (0.119) (0.109) (0.044)
PEs -0.025*** -0.038*** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.024*** 0.002 -0.021***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
PI 0.243*** 0.350*** 0.255** 0.541*** 0.311*** 0.359*** 0.294***
(0.075) (0.112) (0.106) (0.087) (0.091) (0.101) (0.036)
male -0.652* -0.018 0.376 -0.785** -0.600 -0.491 -0.341**
(0.356) (0.355) (0.366) (0.360) (0.390) (0.389) (0.151)
ind -0.928 -0.903 1.725** -0.350 -1.443 -0.740 -0.398
(0.717) (0.872) (0.739) (1.697) (0.973) (0.965) (0.378)
black -1.106** -0.776* -0.309 0.416 -1.090* 0.112 -0.518**
(0.459) (0.466) (0.513) (0.492) (0.570) (0.612) (0.207)
white -0.676 0.151 -1.608** 1.500** -1.621*** -1.147** -0.537**
(0.580) (0.644) (0.771) (0.682) (0.607) (0.581) (0.266)
other 0.463 -0.139 0.064 0.660 -0.176 -0.548 0.034
(0.514) (0.490) (0.492) (0.459) (0.498) (0.488) (0.195)
Ecuador
PE 0.955*** 0.840*** 0.752*** 0.870*** 0.773*** 0.564*** 0.882***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.083) (0.084) (0.080) (0.103) (0.034)
PEs -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.011* -0.017*** -0.012** -0.012* -0.019***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
PI 0.138** 0.245*** 0.321*** 0.249*** 0.209*** 0.359*** 0.233***
(0.064) (0.073) (0.067) (0.078) (0.068) (0.068) (0.028)
male 0.118 0.217 -0.107 -0.088 0.372 0.540** 0.178*
(0.245) (0.251) (0.255) (0.254) (0.251) (0.234) (0.103)
ind -1.903*** -0.853** -1.464** -0.170 -0.734 -0.814 -1.146***
(0.496) (0.422) (0.570) (0.664) (0.461) (0.843) (0.230)
black -0.222 -1.376*** -1.338 0.540 -1.346** 0.322 -0.486*
(0.707) (0.527) (0.867) (0.656) (0.679) (0.508) (0.281)
white 0.350 -0.422 0.024 0.782 0.257 -0.693 -0.024
(0.575) (0.502) (0.457) (0.545) (0.562) (0.491) (0.218)
other 0.395 -0.360 0.181 0.086 0.018 -0.724 -0.015
(0.717) (0.552) (0.648) (0.529) (0.582) (0.496) (0.244)
El Salvador
PE 1.397*** 0.843*** 1.138*** 0.777*** 1.077*** 0.806*** 0.985***
(0.088) (0.126) (0.138) (0.143) (0.120) (0.110) (0.049)
PEs -0.052*** -0.025*** -0.052*** -0.023** -0.040*** -0.020** -0.033***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004)
PI 0.217*** 0.191** 0.274*** 0.286*** 0.213*** 0.258*** 0.232***
(0.061) (0.091) (0.101) (0.085) (0.072) (0.088) (0.033)
male 0.514* 0.729* 1.249*** 0.474 0.342 0.507 0.667***
(0.274) (0.382) (0.356) (0.372) (0.319) (0.329) (0.139)
ind 0.574 0.643 -1.211 -2.370*** -0.627 0.044 -0.630*
(0.928) (0.739) (0.771) (0.620) (0.673) (1.020) (0.322)
black 0.438 -0.063 0.244 0.499 1.002 -3.235*** -1.213***
(1.160) (0.930) (2.287) (0.843) (0.917) (0.526) (0.377)
white 0.881* 0.300 -0.090 -1.672*** 0.678 0.073 -0.083
(0.469) (0.659) (0.560) (0.529) (0.485) (0.390) (0.176)
other 0.565 -0.416 0.274 -1.368** -0.458 1.187 -0.219
(0.544) (0.525) (0.707) (0.632) (0.746) (1.250) (0.276)
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Guatemala
PE 0.291** 0.937*** 1.014*** 0.761*** 0.545*** 0.121 0.606***
(0.114) (0.138) (0.127) (0.136) (0.132) (0.127) (0.054)
PEs 0.010 -0.017 -0.034*** -0.020* -0.003 0.033*** -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
PI 0.274*** 0.178* 0.222*** 0.375*** 0.413*** 0.262** 0.239***
(0.080) (0.092) (0.068) (0.096) (0.111) (0.109) (0.035)
male 0.064 -0.003 0.855*** 0.770** 0.887** 1.358*** 0.655***
(0.283) (0.319) (0.277) (0.336) (0.367) (0.370) (0.134)
ind -1.112*** -0.548 -1.740*** -1.927*** -2.304*** -0.817 -1.420***
(0.339) (0.363) (0.329) (0.426) (0.623) (0.510) (0.168)
black -2.235*** 1.958* -1.061 -0.156 -3.769*** -4.874** -1.228**
(0.859) (1.048) (0.977) (0.694) (0.914) (2.355) (0.579)
white -0.566 -0.992* -0.391 -0.258 -0.594 -0.479 -0.286
(0.611) (0.553) (0.492) (0.496) (0.625) (0.497) (0.210)
other -0.792 1.346 -0.571 -1.815 -1.043 0.270 -0.956**
(0.596) (1.457) (0.678) (1.181) (1.213) (1.514) (0.389)
Honduras
PE 0.765*** 0.370*** 0.755*** 0.643*** 0.881*** 0.692*** 0.652***
(0.123) (0.113) (0.103) (0.105) (0.092) (0.093) (0.042)
PEs -0.017 -0.001 -0.015* 0.002 -0.018** -0.013* -0.008**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
PI 0.035 0.189** 0.216*** 0.015 0.253*** 0.297*** 0.162***
(0.068) (0.079) (0.074) (0.081) (0.079) (0.072) (0.030)
male -0.285 -0.184 0.082 0.491 0.096 -0.656** -0.065
(0.327) (0.327) (0.312) (0.329) (0.296) (0.295) (0.129)
ind -0.625 -1.245*** -0.868 -0.564 0.659 -1.634*** -0.689***
(0.442) (0.455) (0.536) (0.480) (0.479) (0.435) (0.192)
black 0.107 -0.312 -0.464 -0.935 1.048 -1.711** -0.225
(0.892) (0.849) (0.886) (0.854) (1.009) (0.780) (0.405)
white -0.165 -0.059 0.353 -1.109** 0.140 -0.840* -0.201
(0.509) (0.419) (0.453) (0.486) (0.460) (0.454) (0.192)
other 0.342 -0.894 -1.508*** -0.092 -0.439 1.145 -0.412
(0.629) (0.915) (0.484) (0.586) (0.548) (0.941) (0.269)
Mexico
PE 0.753*** 0.877*** 0.648*** 0.685*** 0.636*** 0.637*** 0.697***
(0.085) (0.092) (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.036)
PEs -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.012** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
PI 0.198*** 0.190** 0.180** 0.339*** 0.328*** 0.254*** 0.255***
(0.064) (0.076) (0.075) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.030)
male 0.446* 0.336 0.531* 0.528* 0.989*** 0.566** 0.560***
(0.266) (0.301) (0.288) (0.278) (0.290) (0.283) (0.116)
ind -1.554*** -0.801* -0.245 -0.622* -1.183*** -0.282 -0.789***
(0.329) (0.461) (0.393) (0.370) (0.372) (0.368) (0.153)
black 0.035 -5.264*** 1.884 -2.895* 0.840 -0.628
(0.617) (1.703) (2.198) (1.680) (1.113) (0.828)
white -1.297*** -0.909** -0.418 -0.387 -0.452 -1.239** -0.799***
(0.448) (0.435) (0.673) (0.450) (0.591) (0.517) (0.205)
other -1.301** 0.363 0.185 -0.385 -1.256* -0.191 -0.431*
(0.525) (0.620) (0.690) (0.693) (0.656) (0.634) (0.259)
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Nicaragua
PE 0.600*** 0.335*** 0.625*** 0.486*** 0.722*** 1.004*** 0.617***
(0.109) (0.103) (0.114) (0.112) (0.120) (0.129) (0.046)
PEs -0.012 0.017** -0.017** -0.002 -0.020** -0.036*** -0.010***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.003)
PI 0.138* 0.271*** 0.352*** 0.337*** 0.147 0.340*** 0.234***
(0.073) (0.081) (0.097) (0.096) (0.095) (0.080) (0.034)
male 0.335 -0.149 0.172 -0.432 -0.716* -0.494 -0.219
(0.345) (0.352) (0.374) (0.378) (0.403) (0.339) (0.150)
ind -1.302** -1.878** -1.626*** -0.958 -0.560 1.507 -1.006***
(0.517) (0.770) (0.577) (0.662) (0.871) (0.916) (0.295)
black -0.308 -2.407*** -0.436 -1.417 -0.965 0.016 -0.978***
(0.768) (0.825) (0.815) (0.936) (0.748) (0.800) (0.338)
white -0.329 -0.781 -0.370 -0.989* -0.430 0.051 -0.608**
(0.532) (0.576) (0.647) (0.597) (0.860) (0.618) (0.255)
other 0.774 -0.929 -0.273 -1.257 2.077 -2.632*** -0.272
(0.990) (0.729) (0.853) (0.808) (1.341) (0.595) (0.392)
Panama
PE 0.935*** 0.848*** 0.669*** 0.996*** 0.649*** 0.544*** 0.807***
(0.093) (0.099) (0.116) (0.100) (0.131) (0.113) (0.043)
PEs -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.016* -0.030*** -0.019** -0.011* -0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003)
PI 0.106 0.298*** 0.328*** 0.160** 0.059 0.134 0.192***
(0.079) (0.075) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080) (0.082) (0.032)
male -0.343 0.125 -0.444 0.451 -0.353 -0.098 -0.124
(0.294) (0.312) (0.343) (0.319) (0.386) (0.328) (0.137)
ind -1.383* -3.642*** -1.462* 1.130 -1.820*** -4.334*** -1.964***
(0.827) (0.393) (0.803) (0.891) (0.698) (0.734) (0.307)
black -0.460 0.949 0.419 -0.275 0.559 -0.153 0.261
(0.416) (0.590) (0.556) (0.466) (0.600) (0.465) (0.216)
white 0.268 1.727*** 0.526 -0.583 -0.242 -0.731* 0.144
(0.394) (0.457) (0.483) (0.453) (0.483) (0.423) (0.187)
other -0.158 0.830 0.068 -0.599 -0.258 -0.732 -0.135
(0.575) (0.571) (0.642) (0.513) (0.898) (0.899) (0.278)
Paraguay
PE 0.853*** 0.890*** 0.833*** 1.156*** 0.603*** -0.252** 0.642***
(0.112) (0.115) (0.088) (0.105) (0.090) (0.122) (0.043)
PEs -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.036*** -0.007 0.043*** -0.008***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.003)
PI -0.107 0.162** 0.077 0.178** 0.380*** 0.332*** 0.194***
(0.082) (0.081) (0.063) (0.075) (0.073) (0.069) (0.030)
male 0.455 0.564* 0.504** 0.393 0.096 0.098 0.297***
(0.297) (0.296) (0.248) (0.264) (0.256) (0.253) (0.111)
ind -1.734 -1.221 -0.050 -1.574** 0.737 -2.455 -1.023**
(1.160) (0.797) (0.751) (0.768) (0.858) (1.689) (0.400)
black 0.940** 0.432 -1.544* -1.768 -2.584 0.336 -1.035**
(0.399) (0.980) (0.936) (1.114) (1.897) (1.880) (0.508)
white 0.043 0.129 -0.329 -1.069*** 0.467* -0.301 -0.325***
(0.316) (0.326) (0.265) (0.284) (0.265) (0.261) (0.117)
other 0.065 -0.523 0.105 -0.235 -0.562 -1.567* -0.468*
(0.609) (0.519) (0.521) (0.541) (0.779) (0.940) (0.248)
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Peru
PE 0.912*** 0.730*** 0.850*** 0.847*** 0.989*** 0.717*** 0.851***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.088) (0.091) (0.099) (0.037)
PEs -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.030*** -0.016*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
PI 0.213*** 0.253*** 0.294*** 0.318*** 0.239*** 0.292*** 0.248***
(0.066) (0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.075) (0.094) (0.032)
male 0.756*** 1.425*** 0.457* 0.794*** 0.695*** 0.962*** 0.839***
(0.281) (0.287) (0.267) (0.257) (0.260) (0.281) (0.110)
ind -0.261 -0.012 -0.034 -0.949* -1.666*** -0.676 -0.561**
(0.525) (0.546) (0.492) (0.514) (0.530) (0.701) (0.222)
black -1.663 -0.389 -2.790*** -0.472 -2.249*** 1.858*** -1.365***
(1.042) (0.814) (0.994) (0.793) (0.803) (0.641) (0.413)
white -0.832* -0.482 -0.630 -0.815 -0.175 -0.333 -0.537***
(0.503) (0.526) (0.504) (0.516) (0.355) (0.462) (0.199)
other 0.729 -0.356 -0.124 -0.654 0.247 -0.289 -0.131
(0.873) (0.739) (0.568) (0.882) (0.919) (0.909) (0.321)
Uruguay
PE 0.661*** 0.533*** 0.517*** 0.997*** 0.632*** 0.756*** 0.681***
(0.084) (0.106) (0.088) (0.094) (0.091) (0.090) (0.038)
PEs -0.010** 0.002 -0.001 -0.030*** -0.011** -0.018*** -0.011***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
PI 0.139** 0.121** 0.282*** 0.128* 0.103 0.315*** 0.182***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) (0.061) (0.025)
male -0.319 -0.115 -0.110 -0.029 0.118 -0.270 -0.134
(0.229) (0.228) (0.208) (0.242) (0.238) (0.205) (0.093)
ind 0.503 -0.995 1.773 -1.844 -0.887 0.167 -0.107
(1.135) (0.778) (3.081) (1.264) (1.473) (0.770) (0.506)
black 0.213 -2.740*** -0.212 -0.359 -2.122*** -0.874 -0.918***
(1.070) (0.878) (0.898) (0.903) (0.625) (0.687) (0.354)
white 0.148 -1.280** 0.771* 0.254 0.078 0.472* 0.248
(0.485) (0.624) (0.426) (0.483) (0.375) (0.279) (0.170)
other 0.047 -2.509*** 0.426 -0.420 0.021 0.278 -0.026
(0.583) (0.781) (0.662) (0.590) (0.607) (0.635) (0.247)
Venezuela
PE 0.823*** 0.456*** -0.054 0.466*** 1.087*** 0.470*** 0.492***
(0.076) (0.093) (0.103) (0.086) (0.166) (0.080) (0.037)
PEs -0.026*** -0.003 0.006 -0.004 -0.042*** -0.005 -0.006***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002)
PI 0.097 0.219*** 0.071 0.225*** 0.184*** 0.245*** 0.128***
(0.067) (0.079) (0.074) (0.074) (0.069) (0.071) (0.030)
male -0.109 -0.273 0.095 -0.180 -0.142 -0.465** -0.244**
(0.249) (0.260) (0.281) (0.284) (0.280) (0.216) (0.108)
ind -1.326*** -0.031 -1.361** 0.806 -0.165 -1.103* -0.761**
(0.496) (1.080) (0.598) (1.169) (0.774) (0.608) (0.298)
black -1.277*** -0.540 0.797 0.055 -1.916*** 0.008 -0.841***
(0.385) (0.529) (0.584) (0.795) (0.557) (0.587) (0.228)
white -0.176 0.396 -0.792** 0.018 0.015 0.295 -0.010
(0.303) (0.293) (0.364) (0.367) (0.328) (0.284) (0.132)
other -0.349 -0.313 -0.008 -0.537* 0.062 -0.118 -0.062
(0.442) (0.374) (0.356) (0.323) (0.389) (0.306) (0.146)
Continued on next page
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Total
PE 0.886*** 0.828*** 0.815*** 0.799*** 0.860*** 0.748*** 0.827***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.009)
PEs -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PI 0.153*** 0.237*** 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.221*** 0.292*** 0.222***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.007)
male 0.132** 0.194*** 0.286*** 0.243*** 0.154** 0.056 0.175***
(0.067) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.028)
ind -1.506*** -1.175*** -1.337*** -1.265*** -1.153*** -1.137*** -1.289***
(0.118) (0.133) (0.124) (0.136) (0.133) (0.146) (0.054)
black -0.659*** -0.473*** -0.407** -0.170 -0.923*** -0.433** -0.524***
(0.156) (0.175) (0.182) (0.180) (0.174) (0.189) (0.072)
white 0.023 0.018 -0.057 -0.004 0.244*** -0.433*** -0.020
(0.077) (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.032)
other -0.351*** -0.429*** 0.033 -0.471*** -0.213 -0.254* -0.280***
(0.132) (0.141) (0.136) (0.128) (0.141) (0.137) (0.056)
Note: *** Significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 %
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Latinobarometro
According to the Gini coefficient from the World Bank Data, in the period of study Ecuador
is one of the countries with the highest decrease of inequality, and the results here show that it
has had one of the major mobility increases. Mobility in Brazil and Nicaragua has gone in the
opposite direction: these countries present less mobility in 2013 than in 2007.
Regarding the control variables, we can see in Table 6 that parental income decile (PI) in
general has a positive and significant effect on educational attainment. Being a man has a
positive but not always significant effect. Similarly, the coefficient of indigenous (ind) is not
significant every time, but it is worth noting its significance and negative sign in Bolivia, one of
the countries with the largest proportion of indigenous people. Likewise, black people seem to
have less education than mestizos (the omitted variable), although the coefficient is not always
significant.
In general, the most influential circumstance of an individual on his/her final educational
attainment seems to be parental education followed by parental income. The other controls not
always play a role, but they are still significant if we look at the totals. All of this means that,
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Table 7: Non-Linear OLS Marginal Effects
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Argentina 0.475 0.429 0.45 0.462 0.437 0.451 0.453
Bolivia 0.734 0.697 0.783 0.751 0.564 0.688 0.712
Brazil 0.744 0.856 0.767 0.8 0.747 0.819 0.794
Chile 0.488 0.526 0.474 0.421 0.47 0.445 0.473
Colombia 0.665 0.685 0.639 0.387 0.374 0.326 0.536
Costa Rica 0.369 0.327 0.308 0.349 0.535 0.248 0.357
Dom. Rep. 0.577 0.762 0.589 0.491 0.639 0.448 0.581
Ecuador 0.759 0.69 0.657 0.7 0.649 0.405 0.691
El Salvador 1.065 0.734 0.948 0.637 0.838 0.68 0.81
Guatemala 0.332 0.871 0.875 0.675 0.532 0.291 0.591
Honduras 0.677 0.367 0.685 0.655 0.759 0.608 0.609
Mexico 0.61 0.671 0.553 0.558 0.518 0.495 0.568
Nicaragua 0.529 0.435 0.511 0.475 0.603 0.825 0.557
Panama 0.652 0.651 0.525 0.66 0.413 0.406 0.562
Paraguay 0.661 0.623 0.686 0.753 0.536 0.106† 0.561
Peru 0.581 0.546 0.57 0.574 0.622 0.504 0.576
Uruguay 0.531 0.552 0.503 0.609 0.48 0.508 0.53
Venezuela 0.571 0.415 -0.012 0.417 0.467 0.4 0.42
Total 0.688 0.647 0.627 0.617 0.629 0.571 0.631
Not significant at the 90% level
† Significant at the 95% level
The rest of values are significatn at the 99% level.
following Roemer (1998)’s literature, Latin America does not present equality of opportunities
for educational attainment.
5.2 Quantile Regression Estimates
Table 8 presents the estimations per year of Eq. (9) for five different quantiles next to its es-
timation on the mean (OLS). The significant difference between each quantile’s and the OLS’
estimation was analyzed looking at the confidence intervals. The difference between coeffi-
cients was also tested.30
30Beta-coefficients of the variables male, other and square parental education were not significantly different
between quantiles in every year. However, this was not the case when computing the quantile regression for the
whole period.
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Table 8: Non-Linear Quantile Regression Estimates for Latin America from 2007 to 2013
OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
2007
PE 0.886*** 0.976*** 1.003*** 0.930*** 0.989*** 0.732***
(0.021) (0.044) (0.041) (0.030) (0.031) (0.014)
PEs -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
PI 0.153*** -1.59e-17 0.144*** 0.187*** 0.109*** 0.022
(0.016) (2.35e-14) (0.029) (0.023) (0.035) (0.025)
male 0.132** -4.76e-16 -0.025 0.136 0.109 0.044
(0.067) (3.29e-14) (0.093) (0.091) (0.085) (0.041)
ind -1.506*** 4.76e-16 -0.959*** -1.915*** -1.304*** -1.935***
(0.118) (2.80e-13) (0.183) (0.177) (0.190) (0.276)
black -0.659*** 4.76e-16 -0.323 -0.957*** -0.761*** -0.583
(0.156) (0.073) (0.217) (0.203) (0.195) (0.421)
white 0.023 0.143 0.296* -0.170* -0.004 -0.044
(0.077) (0.176) (0.166) (0.099) (0.079) (0.047)
other -0.351*** 3.33e-16 -0.263 -0.489*** -0.113 0.022
(0.132) (0.032) (0.174) (0.181) (0.177) (0.100)
2008
PE 0.828*** 0.933*** 1.015*** 0.866*** 0.863*** 0.684***
(0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
PEs -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.024***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PI 0.237*** 0.000 0.196*** 0.295*** 0.224*** 0.155***
(0.019) (0.008) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.033)
male 0.194*** 0.000 0.196** 0.255** 0.210** 0.155**
(0.071) (0.010) (0.087) (0.099) (0.087) (0.068)
ind -1.175*** 0.000 -0.804*** -1.297*** -1.434*** -1.345***
(0.133) (0.009) (0.163) (0.182) (0.192) (0.262)
black -0.473*** 0.000 -0.655*** -0.675*** -0.238 -0.310
(0.175) (0.087) (0.182) (0.245) (0.192) (0.327)
white 0.018 0.200 0.215* -0.140 -0.210** -0.155**
(0.080) (0.154) (0.125) (0.108) (0.102) (0.066)
other -0.429*** 0.000 -0.608*** -0.590*** -0.329** -0.270**
(0.141) (0.012) (0.172) (0.199) (0.161) (0.120)
2009
PE 0.815*** 1.000*** 1.010*** 0.892*** 0.785*** 0.574***
(0.022) (0.041) (0.040) (0.031) (0.038) (0.034)
PEs -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PI 0.244*** 0.000 0.250*** 0.285*** 0.250*** 0.200***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.034)
male 0.286*** 0.000 0.026 0.293*** 0.250*** 0.251***
(0.069) (0.013) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.093)
ind -1.337*** 0.000 -0.776*** -1.561*** -1.250*** -1.290***
(0.124) (0.039) (0.176) (0.251) (0.181) (0.308)
black -0.407** 0.000 -0.526** -0.333 0.000 -0.400*
(0.182) (0.129) (0.214) (0.300) (0.262) (0.226)
white -0.057 0.000 0.232* -0.146 -0.250** -0.310***
(0.079) (0.063) (0.123) (0.110) (0.106) (0.099)
other 0.033 0.000 -0.294 0.000 0.250 0.200
(0.136) (0.019) (0.198) (0.215) (0.187) (0.236)
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OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
2010
PE 0.799*** 0.961*** 0.993*** 0.855*** 0.843*** 0.625***
(0.022) (0.039) (0.043) (0.034) (0.028) (0.032)
PEs -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
PI 0.242*** 0.000 0.211*** 0.273*** 0.244*** 0.156***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028)
male 0.243*** 0.000 0.211** 0.309*** 0.244*** 0.031
(0.069) (0.032) (0.090) (0.097) (0.081) (0.064)
ind -1.265*** 0.000 -0.606*** -1.782*** -1.512*** -0.573***
(0.136) (0.040) (0.213) (0.181) (0.153) (0.213)
black -0.170 0.000 0.207 -0.327 -5.77e-15 -0.198
(0.180) (0.035) (0.265) (0.215) (0.213) (0.211)
white -0.004 0.000 0.404*** -0.145 -0.463*** -0.188**
(0.078) (0.159) (0.135) (0.122) (0.094) (0.079)
other -0.471*** 0.000 -0.394** -0.527*** -0.732*** -0.344**
(0.128) (0.052) (0.181) (0.187) (0.146) (0.161)
2011
PE 0.860*** 1.018*** 1.066*** 0.952*** 0.842*** 0.612***
(0.023) (0.046) (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
PEs -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PI 0.221*** 0.000 0.202*** 0.250*** 0.200*** 0.126***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.022) (0.029) (0.024)
male 0.154** 0.000 0.030 0.250** 0.225** 0.081
(0.069) (0.023) (0.092) (0.109) (0.092) (0.072)
ind -1.153*** 0.000 -0.616*** -1.357*** -1.400*** -0.829***
(0.133) (0.027) (0.171) (0.200) (0.165) (0.270)
black -0.923*** 0.000 -0.646*** -1.357*** -1.125*** -0.441
(0.174) (0.072) (0.169) (0.234) (0.259) (0.281)
white 0.244*** 0.571** 0.778*** 0.143 -0.200** -0.207***
(0.077) (0.243) (0.142) (0.111) (0.092) (0.069)
other -0.213 0.000 -0.404** -0.286 -0.200 -0.126
(0.141) (0.018) (0.200) (0.213) (0.183) (0.144)
2013
PE 0.748*** 1.065*** 0.974*** 0.835*** 0.671*** 0.459***
(0.023) (0.045) (0.040) (0.028) (0.034) (0.030)
PEs -0.017*** -0.029*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PI 0.292*** 0.068* 0.284*** 0.333*** 0.283*** 0.152***
(0.019) (0.035) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.028)
male 0.056 0.068 0.067 1.67e-16 0.051 0.023
(0.069) (0.045) (0.083) (0.075) (0.087) (0.072)
ind -1.137*** -0.137 -0.862*** -1.333*** -1.071*** -0.667***
(0.146) (0.097) (0.175) (0.252) (0.255) (0.197)
black -0.433** -0.205 -0.929*** -0.333 -0.123 -0.340*
(0.189) (0.147) (0.187) (0.297) (0.204) (0.190)
white -0.433*** 0.000 -0.310** -0.667*** -0.639*** -0.363***
(0.076) (0.044) (0.126) (0.096) (0.097) (0.092)
other -0.254* -0.137 -0.377* -0.333* -0.388** -0.211
(0.137) (0.113) (0.208) (0.201) (0.190) (0.132)
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OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Total
PE 0.827*** 0.967*** 1.002*** 0.898*** 0.836*** 0.615***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
PEs -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PI 0.222*** 0.000 0.215*** 0.251*** 0.203*** 0.143***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
male 0.175*** 0.000 0.065 0.187*** 0.203*** 0.098***
(0.028) (0.001) (0.055) (0.044) (0.030) (0.037)
ind -1.289*** 0.000 -0.858*** -1.524*** -1.407*** -1.000***
(0.054) (0.001) (0.068) (0.082) (0.081) (0.116)
black -0.524*** 0.000 -0.643*** -0.706*** -0.260** -0.286***
(0.072) (0.001) (0.072) (0.110) (0.105) (0.105)
white -0.020 0.056 0.215*** -0.138** -0.220*** -0.187***
(0.032) (0.069) (0.068) (0.058) (0.047) (0.040)
other -0.280*** 0.000 -0.461*** -0.347*** -0.220** -0.125**
(0.056) (0.001) (0.080) (0.082) (0.088) (0.059)
Note: *** Significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 %
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Latinobarometro
Parental education always has a positive effect on educational attainment, which varies
across quantiles, and it is significantly different from the OLS-beta most of the times. Quantile
.75 is the one that sometimes does not significantly differ from the mean regression.
On the other hand, the squared term of parental education is not typically different from
the mean estimation. These results suggest that, unlike the linear effect of parental education,
the non-linear one does not depend on the distribution of educational attainment of the child.
However, it is still important because of the marginal effects, which vary depending on the point
at which mobility is being evaluated. In fact, as we will see in Table 9, marginal effects in every
quantile are significantly different from the OLS estimation.
Parental income decile does not seem to have a significant effect on the quantile .10, which
could come from the lack of variation of this control at the bottom of the distribution. In most of
the years, it is significantly different from the OLS-coefficient only at quantiles 0.10 and 0.90.
In terms of mobility, as in the OLS estimations, it has increased from 2007 to 2013. But here
we also learn that the less educated children (quantile 0.10) are not part of this phenomenon. In
fact, mobility has decreased for them over the period.
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Figure 1: Non-Linear Quantile Regression Estimates for Latin America from 2007 to 2013
In order to analyze how the effect of parental education varies across quantiles, it is easier
to look at it graphically. Figure 1 presents the intercepts across quantiles, as well as the beta-
coefficients for the linear and non-linear term of parental education and for parental income.
The confidence intervals of the OLS and the QR are also indicated.
The top right quadrant shows how mobility increases (beta decreases) as we move towards
the top of the distribution of children’s education. Moreover, if we only look only at the linear
term, it seems that those at the quantile .25 are the ones with less educational mobility. At
the same time, the graph shows the low variation of the squared parental education coefficient
across quantiles. The bottom right corner shows the parental income betas and it indicates that
this variable may have a higher effect at the median.
In the same way as with the OLS estimations, given that the model is not linear on parental
education, it is more accurate to look at marginal effects when determining which quantile
has more or less mobility. In order to compute this on the totals row, we calculated a weighted
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Table 9: Marginal Effects of the Quantile Regression
OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
0.632 0.913 0.898 0.688 0.482 0.254
All values are significant at the 99% level.
average parental education for each quantile following the same structure of quantile regression;
i.e. giving more (less) weight to the positive (negative) deviation as we move towards the top
(bottom) quantiles. The results are shown in Table 9.
Now that both coefficients of parental education are combined, the results show that actually
the bottom 10% are the children with less educational mobility, and not the 25%. The beta
decreases from here to the top by about 72%. Furthermore, the biggest mobility increase takes
place when going from quantile .75 to .90. This shows how the top of the distribution greatly
differs from the rest in terms of educational mobility. As said before, the non-linear effect of
parental education did not seem to vary across quantiles. However, when computing a linear
combination, the marginal effects across all the distribution are significantly different from the
OLS estimation.
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that educational intergenerational mobility in Latin America remains high,although
it has increased over the years for most of the countries. This reduction may be the result of
lower poverty and inequality levels over the region in the wake of the commodities boom and
its leftwing governments. Average public education spending over the past decade increased
from 4.5% of GDP to 5.0%. However, this spending did not increase enough the quality, nor
the coverage of secondary or higher education (UNESCO, 2014).
The fact that Latin America still shows a deficient quality of education, and intermediate
to low coverage of higher than primary education levels, may be one of the sources of lower
mobility rates at the bottom of the distribution. There are significant differences in access to
education, both in terms of quality and quantity, among social classes. Furthermore, the results
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of this paper suggest a type of educational trap for the less educated, given that they have the
lowest mobility rates.
The literature about inequality in Latin America advises that now that the commodities
boom is over, the process of decreasing inequality is no longer sustainable. For example, Gachet
et al. (2017) show that in Ecuador there has been a shift away from market sources towards
sources of income derived from government expenditures. After the fall in oil prices, this has
led to stagnation in the inequality reduction. This may have important implications for the
increase of mobility observed during the last decade. Therefore, it would be interesting to
analyze mobility on the years after the commodities boom once the data becomes available.
This paper also finds important differences among countries. The ranking is slightly differ-
ent when comparing the linear and the non-linear OLS estimations: in the former, Ecuador is
the least mobile country followed by Brazil, while El Salvador and Brazil are at the top in the
latter. Costa Rica is the country with more educational mobility in both models. In general, the
results of this paper are not directly comparable with most of the existent evidence, given that
the model specifications are different, and quantile regression has not been computed for the
entire region. Furthermore, many of the available literature is based on periods before the one
analyzed here.
Regarding the non-linearities, we find that it is important to include the squared term of
parental education, not only because of its significance, but because without it, mobility is being
over-estimated. This means that reality may be worse than what the literature based on linear
models suggest. This statement is reinforced when computing the quantile regression, which
yields the educational trap mentioned before. The OLS estimation increases by about 44% and
decreases 60% when going from the mean towards the bottom and top quantiles, respectively.
Therefore, we cannot talk about one mobility estimation for the whole distribution. There is
non-linearity of parental education, although it does not vary across quantiles.
Given the meritocracy in the labor market in Latin America -meaning high returns to education-
, the educational trap may have important implications in the future income of the less educated
ones. At the same time, this could affect inequality levels, turning into a vicious circle. As
Reeves (2017) states, meritocracy is not synonymous with fairness. Latin America’s labor mar-
46
ket is doing a good job rewarding education, but not when providing opportunities to acquire
this merit.
Among the circumstances that were included in the model, parental education is by far the
most influential one on children’s educational attainment. Latin America is failing to provide
equality of opportunities to access education, especially for those at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. In the future of those people, the dependence on their parents’ education might translate
into low income in the labor market because they did not acquire the kind of merit that is being
rewarded:
“Children born into upper middle-class families have successfully avoided what
James Heckman, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, describes as ‘the biggest mar-
ket failure of all’, picking the ‘wrong’ parents” (Reeves, 2017, p. 30).
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8 Appendix
This appendix presents the variations from the OLS linear model regarding the non-linearities
introduced in this paper, i.e. on the independent variable (adding squared parental education)
and on the dependent variable (computing the quantile regression with linear parental educa-
tion).
Table 10 presents the estimations of Eq. (1) per year and per country. The only difference
with Table 6 is the omission of the squared parental education variable.
Parental education always has a positive and significant effect on children’s educational
attainment. Similarly, parental income decile has a positive effect, and it is significant most of
the times. The gender and identity controls vary across years and countries, although we can
identify a generally positive effect for being a man, and a negative one for being indigenous
or black. Again, the most influential circumstance of an individual on his final educational
attainment seems to be parental education followed by parental income.
Unlike the marginal effects from Table 7, here the least mobile country is Ecuador with
a beta-coefficient of 0.640, followed by Brazil. Costa Rica is again the most mobile country.
Looking at mobility over time, in every country, except Brazil, Nicaragua and Guatemala, there
is an increase of mobility, which as explained before is consistent with the inequality reduction
in the region. In fact, looking at all the countries together, the beta-coefficient went from 0.582
in 2007 to 0.525 in 2013.
When going from Eq. (1) to Eq. (2), the linear effect of parental education increases. For
example, looking at the estimations for the region from 2007 to 2013, it goes from 0.561 in Eq
(1) to 0.827 in Eq (2). Now, if we compute the marginal effect on the average parental education
for Eq. (2)31, it yields a beta coefficient of 0.632. This means that educational mobility is being
over estimated on the regression to the mean if we only take into account the linear term of
parental education.
31Marginal effect=0.827+2∗ (−0.02)∗4.88, where 4.88 is the average parental education
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Table 10: Linear OLS Estimations per country and per year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Argentina
PE 0.468*** 0.419*** 0.444*** 0.463*** 0.425*** 0.439*** 0.443***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.011)
PI 0.182*** 0.261*** 0.272*** 0.167*** 0.041 0.235*** 0.198***
(0.055) (0.065) (0.062) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.024)
male 0.165 -0.302 0.045 -0.374* -0.450** -0.441** -0.220**
(0.208) (0.224) (0.218) (0.203) (0.205) (0.205) (0.086)
ind 1.520 0.194 1.539** 1.398 -1.042 0.048 0.513
(1.129) (1.022) (0.718) (1.098) (0.847) (0.637) (0.389)
black -0.701 -2.292*** -1.179 -2.995*** 1.119 5.371*** -0.935
(0.981) (0.810) (1.411) (0.543) (0.987) (0.373) (0.678)
white 0.388 0.783*** 0.648*** 0.772*** -0.038 0.067 0.399***
(0.279) (0.297) (0.245) (0.274) (0.236) (0.267) (0.108)
other -0.623 0.316 0.187 0.394 0.824 0.201 0.138
(0.449) (0.637) (0.655) (1.025) (0.508) (0.644) (0.257)
Bolivia
PE 0.590*** 0.556*** 0.579*** 0.554*** 0.447*** 0.527*** 0.545***
(0.024) (0.034) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.012)
PI 0.129* 0.372*** 0.176** 0.290*** 0.304*** 0.482*** 0.285***
(0.070) (0.094) (0.078) (0.090) (0.090) (0.093) (0.035)
male 1.206*** 1.002*** 1.246*** 1.205*** 0.667** 1.198*** 1.099***
(0.268) (0.294) (0.263) (0.295) (0.329) (0.318) (0.120)
ind -2.089*** -1.840*** -2.139*** -2.239*** -2.490*** -1.070*** -1.988***
(0.319) (0.344) (0.301) (0.342) (0.396) (0.372) (0.140)
black 2.340*** -1.852 -1.165 -2.519 3.660*** 1.074 0.115
(0.410) (2.120) (1.631) (3.088) (0.817) (0.987) (0.954)
white 0.860 -1.782** -0.112 -0.358 0.967 -1.103 -0.202
(0.543) (0.794) (0.684) (0.708) (0.859) (1.343) (0.312)
other -1.759*** -0.874 -2.168*** 1.347 0.244 0.117 -0.833*
(0.656) (1.551) (0.817) (0.953) (1.121) (1.350) (0.471)
Brazil
PE 0.620*** 0.636*** 0.576*** 0.632*** 0.620*** 0.639*** 0.624***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.013)
PI 0.113* 0.097 0.236*** 0.205*** 0.199*** 0.062 0.153***
(0.065) (0.072) (0.067) (0.066) (0.073) (0.068) (0.028)
male -0.424 -0.319 -0.530* -0.481* -0.156 -0.347 -0.380***
(0.278) (0.282) (0.273) (0.257) (0.264) (0.272) (0.110)
ind -1.104 0.583 -0.474 -0.091 -1.485* 0.521 -0.295
(0.829) (1.057) (0.889) (0.693) (0.860) (0.803) (0.367)
black -0.096 0.067 0.281 -0.207 -0.694 0.584 -0.024
(0.501) (0.476) (0.449) (0.455) (0.437) (0.491) (0.190)
white -0.129 0.953*** -0.040 0.769** 1.363*** 1.182*** 0.685***
(0.417) (0.349) (0.339) (0.360) (0.372) (0.365) (0.149)
other -1.016** -0.038 -0.927** -0.854** -0.028 0.451 -0.431**
(0.465) (0.471) (0.452) (0.410) (0.486) (0.426) (0.181)
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Chile
PE 0.487*** 0.535*** 0.486*** 0.436*** 0.473*** 0.457*** 0.482***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.011)
PI 0.239*** 0.230*** 0.302*** 0.249*** 0.135** 0.232*** 0.230***
(0.066) (0.064) (0.068) (0.057) (0.053) (0.060) (0.026)
male 0.432** 0.644*** 0.314 0.327* 0.516*** 0.040 0.377***
(0.209) (0.193) (0.210) (0.177) (0.163) (0.182) (0.078)
ind -0.109 0.035 -0.585 -0.979** -0.431 -0.934** -0.505***
(0.393) (0.446) (0.499) (0.381) (0.344) (0.467) (0.170)
black -1.261** -2.945*** -5.705*** 2.036* -0.765*** 2.945*** -0.715
(0.518) (0.714) (0.248) (1.086) (0.203) (0.461) (0.791)
white -0.200 -0.473* -0.013 -0.074 0.127 -0.142 -0.113
(0.224) (0.252) (0.224) (0.219) (0.193) (0.193) (0.088)
other -0.758 -1.045*** 0.912* -0.427 -0.358 -0.698 -0.379
(0.735) (0.390) (0.505) (0.673) (0.579) (0.775) (0.276)
Colombia
PE 0.536*** 0.489*** 0.515*** 0.379*** 0.373*** 0.326*** 0.486***
(0.029) (0.040) (0.034) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.012)
PI 0.216*** 0.334*** 0.100 0.363*** 0.410*** 0.392*** 0.237***
(0.063) (0.082) (0.072) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.028)
male 0.461* -0.364 -0.006 0.680*** -0.036 -0.260 0.052
(0.267) (0.344) (0.307) (0.254) (0.237) (0.238) (0.115)
ind -2.379*** -0.929 -1.244** -0.377 -1.036** -0.426 -1.077***
(0.597) (0.629) (0.619) (0.583) (0.523) (0.648) (0.260)
black -0.481 -0.466 -0.559 -0.965 -1.295** -0.384 -0.788***
(0.553) (0.600) (0.640) (0.622) (0.632) (0.531) (0.252)
white -0.668** -0.375 -0.069 -0.293 -0.462* -0.688** -0.589***
(0.294) (0.372) (0.349) (0.287) (0.267) (0.286) (0.129)
other -0.019 -0.706 0.680 0.269 -0.450 -0.100 -0.193
(0.662) (0.694) (0.567) (0.483) (0.431) (0.508) (0.239)
Costa Rica
PE 0.364*** 0.351*** 0.325*** 0.391*** 0.506*** 0.334*** 0.379***
(0.040) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.016)
PI 0.192** 0.214** 0.291*** 0.207*** 0.158** 0.078 0.196***
(0.074) (0.088) (0.082) (0.078) (0.075) (0.099) (0.033)
male -0.129 0.433 0.827*** 0.537* 0.295 -0.239 0.309**
(0.346) (0.354) (0.318) (0.322) (0.318) (0.370) (0.138)
ind -1.247 -2.789*** -0.877 1.284 1.543 -0.316 -0.175
(0.835) (1.078) (0.812) (1.542) (1.001) (1.126) (0.423)
black -0.822 0.767 0.024 2.705*** 1.018 -0.634 0.612
(1.621) (2.122) (1.325) (0.997) (0.966) (1.239) (0.534)
white -0.588 0.079 0.021 0.616* 0.349 0.040 0.082
(0.397) (0.388) (0.369) (0.357) (0.375) (0.432) (0.158)
other -0.203 -0.277 -0.332 0.006 -0.593 -0.716 -0.397*
(0.553) (0.546) (0.492) (0.485) (0.439) (0.596) (0.212)
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Dominican Republic
PE 0.467*** 0.643*** 0.493*** 0.376*** 0.535*** 0.456*** 0.497***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.034) (0.015)
PI 0.245*** 0.346*** 0.275*** 0.518*** 0.325*** 0.358*** 0.300***
(0.076) (0.114) (0.106) (0.087) (0.091) (0.101) (0.036)
male -0.633* -0.058 0.407 -0.750** -0.561 -0.489 -0.331**
(0.358) (0.362) (0.371) (0.362) (0.394) (0.389) (0.152)
ind -0.803 -0.842 1.708** -0.322 -1.661* -0.747 -0.367
(0.708) (0.920) (0.750) (1.706) (0.944) (0.963) (0.379)
black -0.956** -0.689 -0.245 0.407 -1.144** 0.108 -0.465**
(0.464) (0.476) (0.517) (0.494) (0.573) (0.611) (0.208)
white -0.469 0.034 -1.408* 1.433** -1.838*** -1.146** -0.517*
(0.586) (0.652) (0.774) (0.692) (0.602) (0.581) (0.267)
other 0.547 -0.258 0.099 0.770* -0.108 -0.563 0.104
(0.513) (0.494) (0.498) (0.460) (0.501) (0.487) (0.196)
Ecuador
PE 0.687*** 0.637*** 0.625*** 0.657*** 0.622*** 0.390*** 0.640***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.012)
PI 0.159** 0.252*** 0.318*** 0.238*** 0.211*** 0.353*** 0.233***
(0.064) (0.073) (0.067) (0.078) (0.068) (0.068) (0.028)
male 0.109 0.222 -0.111 -0.086 0.318 0.534** 0.160
(0.247) (0.251) (0.256) (0.255) (0.249) (0.235) (0.104)
ind -2.132*** -0.992** -1.590*** -0.287 -0.815* -0.814 -1.326***
(0.496) (0.428) (0.561) (0.681) (0.462) (0.837) (0.232)
black -0.378 -1.429*** -1.313 0.633 -1.378** 0.357 -0.506*
(0.704) (0.526) (0.870) (0.655) (0.672) (0.502) (0.282)
white 0.205 -0.397 -0.063 0.725 0.217 -0.665 -0.069
(0.569) (0.505) (0.457) (0.554) (0.560) (0.479) (0.219)
other 0.450 -0.329 0.152 0.078 0.006 -0.773 -0.025
(0.712) (0.546) (0.643) (0.525) (0.586) (0.485) (0.241)
El Salvador
PE 0.747*** 0.552*** 0.551*** 0.505*** 0.605*** 0.575*** 0.601***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.053) (0.044) (0.046) (0.037) (0.017)
PI 0.186*** 0.204** 0.281*** 0.293*** 0.215*** 0.266*** 0.234***
(0.065) (0.091) (0.102) (0.086) (0.072) (0.088) (0.033)
male 0.518* 0.718* 1.312*** 0.471 0.340 0.500 0.672***
(0.289) (0.384) (0.363) (0.374) (0.324) (0.330) (0.141)
ind 1.323 0.679 -1.171 -2.316*** -0.631 -0.003 -0.577*
(0.927) (0.737) (0.780) (0.619) (0.667) (1.018) (0.322)
black -0.314 -0.078 0.414 0.763 0.845 -3.236*** -1.223***
(1.129) (0.932) (2.602) (0.814) (1.008) (0.543) (0.389)
white 0.879 0.184 -0.026 -1.720*** 0.462 0.106 -0.065
(0.556) (0.664) (0.581) (0.539) (0.486) (0.394) (0.178)
other 0.432 -0.581 0.424 -1.354** -0.257 1.293 -0.260
(0.622) (0.525) (0.738) (0.646) (0.740) (1.247) (0.281)
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Guatemala
PE 0.389*** 0.753*** 0.652*** 0.549*** 0.516*** 0.483*** 0.574***
(0.052) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053) (0.057) (0.050) (0.021)
PI 0.273*** 0.173* 0.201*** 0.377*** 0.412*** 0.277** 0.239***
(0.080) (0.092) (0.067) (0.096) (0.111) (0.112) (0.035)
male 0.067 -0.033 0.797*** 0.764** 0.880** 1.315*** 0.652***
(0.283) (0.317) (0.279) (0.336) (0.366) (0.375) (0.133)
ind -1.129*** -0.571 -1.837*** -2.011*** -2.316*** -0.671 -1.426***
(0.342) (0.367) (0.328) (0.421) (0.622) (0.511) (0.167)
black -2.236** 2.184** -1.017 -0.263 -3.757*** -4.854* -1.222**
(0.875) (1.029) (1.018) (0.637) (0.917) (2.566) (0.580)
white -0.624 -0.915* -0.374 -0.233 -0.598 -0.542 -0.279
(0.611) (0.552) (0.491) (0.501) (0.626) (0.509) (0.210)
other -0.835 1.342 -0.682 -1.777 -1.037 0.080 -0.952**
(0.596) (1.475) (0.654) (1.176) (1.211) (1.428) (0.388)
Honduras
PE 0.598*** 0.364*** 0.591*** 0.664*** 0.676*** 0.539*** 0.567***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.018)
PI 0.035 0.189** 0.218*** 0.015 0.246*** 0.298*** 0.163***
(0.068) (0.079) (0.074) (0.081) (0.079) (0.072) (0.030)
male -0.323 -0.185 0.044 0.501 0.114 -0.636** -0.074
(0.325) (0.326) (0.313) (0.323) (0.298) (0.296) (0.129)
ind -0.578 -1.244*** -0.850 -0.561 0.654 -1.674*** -0.688***
(0.441) (0.455) (0.537) (0.479) (0.482) (0.435) (0.192)
black 0.162 -0.313 -0.460 -0.920 1.092 -1.767** -0.232
(0.890) (0.849) (0.901) (0.852) (1.034) (0.773) (0.407)
white -0.166 -0.058 0.377 -1.111** 0.083 -0.807* -0.194
(0.502) (0.417) (0.455) (0.486) (0.446) (0.448) (0.191)
other 0.389 -0.893 -1.563*** -0.094 -0.505 1.129 -0.412
(0.627) (0.913) (0.489) (0.586) (0.551) (0.943) (0.269)
Mexico
PE 0.523*** 0.539*** 0.497*** 0.484*** 0.444*** 0.414*** 0.487***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.013)
PI 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.179** 0.344*** 0.339*** 0.260*** 0.263***
(0.063) (0.076) (0.075) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.030)
male 0.498* 0.343 0.530* 0.487* 0.982*** 0.589** 0.564***
(0.266) (0.305) (0.289) (0.279) (0.291) (0.284) (0.116)
ind -1.612*** -0.868* -0.324 -0.702* -1.171*** -0.306 -0.839***
(0.329) (0.463) (0.390) (0.370) (0.372) (0.376) (0.154)
black 0.177 -5.002*** 1.796 -2.798* 1.072 -0.488
(0.557) (1.720) (2.319) (1.605) (1.101) (0.828)
white -1.323*** -0.965** -0.379 -0.385 -0.429 -1.281** -0.816***
(0.445) (0.435) (0.668) (0.456) (0.587) (0.513) (0.204)
other -1.239** 0.313 0.175 -0.342 -1.265* -0.224 -0.431*
(0.531) (0.639) (0.693) (0.688) (0.660) (0.639) (0.261)
Continued on next page
57
Table 10 – Continued from previous page
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 Total
Nicaragua
PE 0.454*** 0.549*** 0.407*** 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.580*** 0.489***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.048) (0.039) (0.046) (0.052) (0.018)
PI 0.135* 0.299*** 0.350*** 0.336*** 0.133 0.356*** 0.229***
(0.073) (0.080) (0.097) (0.096) (0.095) (0.082) (0.034)
male 0.340 -0.087 0.186 -0.435 -0.757* -0.578* -0.233
(0.345) (0.351) (0.376) (0.377) (0.404) (0.345) (0.150)
ind -1.243** -1.814** -1.577*** -0.960 -0.592 1.561* -0.998***
(0.524) (0.782) (0.566) (0.663) (0.868) (0.915) (0.295)
black -0.294 -2.482*** -0.484 -1.418 -1.006 0.049 -0.975***
(0.762) (0.836) (0.808) (0.934) (0.722) (0.822) (0.336)
white -0.331 -0.858 -0.279 -0.978* -0.491 -0.030 -0.587**
(0.533) (0.584) (0.645) (0.587) (0.823) (0.612) (0.254)
other 0.772 -1.004 -0.264 -1.252 2.148 -2.305*** -0.247
(1.003) (0.740) (0.836) (0.803) (1.367) (0.489) (0.390)
Panama
PE 0.577*** 0.508*** 0.461*** 0.599*** 0.372*** 0.381*** 0.489***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.039) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034) (0.015)
PI 0.096 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.160** 0.066 0.128 0.194***
(0.079) (0.075) (0.080) (0.077) (0.082) (0.083) (0.032)
male -0.267 0.061 -0.497 0.376 -0.350 -0.129 -0.158
(0.299) (0.315) (0.343) (0.325) (0.388) (0.329) (0.138)
ind -1.398* -3.781*** -1.579** 0.825 -1.867*** -4.558*** -2.151***
(0.847) (0.395) (0.785) (0.919) (0.716) (0.720) (0.313)
black -0.364 1.014* 0.483 -0.420 0.698 -0.224 0.270
(0.432) (0.588) (0.554) (0.472) (0.607) (0.458) (0.217)
white 0.288 1.928*** 0.491 -0.679 -0.107 -0.675 0.214
(0.404) (0.453) (0.482) (0.453) (0.481) (0.422) (0.188)
other -0.151 1.069* 0.038 -0.782 -0.285 -0.845 -0.154
(0.582) (0.579) (0.650) (0.535) (0.905) (0.904) (0.283)
Paraguay
PE 0.589*** 0.535*** 0.622*** 0.626*** 0.510*** 0.099* 0.531***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.051) (0.014)
PI -0.128 0.140* 0.080 0.204*** 0.382*** 0.333*** 0.192***
(0.082) (0.080) (0.063) (0.075) (0.072) (0.069) (0.030)
male 0.471 0.609** 0.502** 0.362 0.081 0.095 0.297***
(0.298) (0.299) (0.249) (0.269) (0.256) (0.255) (0.111)
ind -1.683 -1.463* -0.210 -1.936** 0.717 -2.384 -1.088***
(1.211) (0.816) (0.788) (0.835) (0.855) (1.790) (0.403)
black 0.987** 0.442 -1.582* -1.886* -2.635 0.153 -1.042**
(0.463) (1.177) (0.922) (1.136) (1.949) (1.883) (0.516)
white 0.072 0.124 -0.342 -1.147*** 0.454* -0.265 -0.332***
(0.317) (0.328) (0.265) (0.288) (0.265) (0.263) (0.117)
other 0.001 -0.552 0.062 -0.277 -0.581 -1.622* -0.491**
(0.616) (0.520) (0.522) (0.571) (0.767) (0.911) (0.249)
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Peru
PE 0.509*** 0.489*** 0.519*** 0.534*** 0.553*** 0.479*** 0.519***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.011)
PI 0.220*** 0.256*** 0.293*** 0.295*** 0.218*** 0.277*** 0.240***
(0.067) (0.082) (0.083) (0.080) (0.077) (0.094) (0.032)
male 0.816*** 1.395*** 0.392 0.789*** 0.692*** 0.969*** 0.830***
(0.284) (0.289) (0.268) (0.259) (0.264) (0.283) (0.112)
ind -0.468 -0.107 -0.195 -1.182** -2.106*** -0.790 -0.772***
(0.533) (0.549) (0.503) (0.510) (0.528) (0.705) (0.224)
black -1.591 -0.312 -2.701*** -0.269 -2.206** 1.791*** -1.288***
(1.030) (0.801) (0.997) (0.810) (0.902) (0.620) (0.415)
white -0.863* -0.707 -0.692 -0.936* -0.482 -0.354 -0.661***
(0.496) (0.528) (0.492) (0.515) (0.369) (0.462) (0.198)
other 0.539 -0.333 -0.059 -0.669 0.019 -0.298 -0.155
(0.934) (0.734) (0.592) (0.896) (0.924) (0.915) (0.325)
Uruguay
PE 0.510*** 0.557*** 0.501*** 0.538*** 0.459*** 0.472*** 0.506***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.028) (0.028) (0.012)
PI 0.129** 0.120** 0.282*** 0.119* 0.093 0.300*** 0.177***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.064) (0.070) (0.067) (0.061) (0.025)
male -0.312 -0.114 -0.108 -0.012 0.130 -0.277 -0.128
(0.229) (0.228) (0.208) (0.246) (0.239) (0.206) (0.093)
ind 0.559 -1.002 1.759 -1.782 -1.123 0.291 -0.092
(1.148) (0.776) (3.073) (1.328) (1.483) (0.750) (0.506)
black 0.216 -2.752*** -0.201 -0.125 -2.092*** -0.940 -0.875**
(1.054) (0.876) (0.892) (0.881) (0.621) (0.692) (0.351)
white 0.177 -1.277** 0.775* 0.348 0.025 0.501* 0.263
(0.490) (0.623) (0.424) (0.483) (0.377) (0.281) (0.171)
other 0.037 -2.481*** 0.431 -0.431 -0.036 0.270 -0.061
(0.585) (0.769) (0.662) (0.593) (0.604) (0.639) (0.247)
Venezuela
PE 0.503*** 0.409*** -0.014 0.405*** 0.418*** 0.396*** 0.405***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.054) (0.030) (0.046) (0.028) (0.013)
PI 0.083 0.218*** 0.069 0.220*** 0.160** 0.247*** 0.127***
(0.068) (0.079) (0.073) (0.074) (0.071) (0.071) (0.030)
male -0.119 -0.285 0.098 -0.174 -0.258 -0.466** -0.254**
(0.252) (0.259) (0.281) (0.284) (0.290) (0.216) (0.108)
ind -1.426*** -0.046 -1.360** 0.825 0.053 -1.141* -0.776***
(0.521) (1.080) (0.598) (1.162) (0.865) (0.609) (0.300)
black -1.164*** -0.529 0.791 0.025 -1.817*** -0.020 -0.833***
(0.394) (0.528) (0.585) (0.797) (0.553) (0.580) (0.228)
white -0.161 0.398 -0.793** 0.003 -0.012 0.293 -0.014
(0.305) (0.293) (0.363) (0.365) (0.341) (0.284) (0.132)
other -0.355 -0.317 -0.008 -0.536* 0.025 -0.101 -0.056
(0.445) (0.372) (0.355) (0.323) (0.407) (0.306) (0.147)
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PE 0.582*** 0.570*** 0.546*** 0.559*** 0.562*** 0.525*** 0.561***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003)
PI 0.154*** 0.241*** 0.248*** 0.239*** 0.222*** 0.292*** 0.223***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.007)
male 0.136** 0.171** 0.278*** 0.230*** 0.139** 0.053 0.166***
(0.067) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.028)
ind -1.612*** -1.273*** -1.455*** -1.383*** -1.297*** -1.234*** -1.404***
(0.119) (0.134) (0.125) (0.137) (0.133) (0.146) (0.054)
black -0.626*** -0.428** -0.364** -0.233 -0.913*** -0.464** -0.521***
(0.158) (0.176) (0.185) (0.180) (0.177) (0.190) (0.072)
white 0.125 0.120 0.024 0.048 0.306*** -0.367*** 0.048
(0.077) (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.032)
other -0.331** -0.437*** 0.057 -0.465*** -0.176 -0.219 -0.262***
(0.132) (0.142) (0.137) (0.129) (0.143) (0.137) (0.056)
Note: *** Significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 %
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Latinobarometro
Given that these are linear estimations, they are comparable with the existent evidence. For
example, Daude (2015) has a very similar model for 2008; the main difference is the number of
identity controls. His estimates and the ones presented on Table 10 are similar for every country,
showing that for this year, Guatemala is where parental education has the highest association to
educational attainment of the offspring; while Costa Rica again presents the highest mobility.
However, as explained before, the correctly specified model seems to be the one with
squared parental education. When adding this term to Eq. (1), it becomes Eq. (2), whose
results are presented in the Empirical Results section (Table 6). On the other hand, adding non-
linearities to Eq. (1) on the dependent variable yields the estimations of Eq. (8), which are
shown in Table 11.
The only difference with Table 8 is the omission of the non-linear parental education vari-
able. Again, the significance of the difference between each quantile’s and the OLS’s estimation
was analyzed using the confidence intervals. The effect of parental education is always different
from the regression to the mean and between quantiles.
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Table 11: Linear Quantile Regression Estimates for Latin America from 2007 to 2013
OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
2007
PE 0.582*** 0.667*** 0.718*** 0.625*** 0.528*** 0.348***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012)
PI 0.154*** 2.78e-17 0.103*** 0.167*** 0.139*** 0.087**
(0.016) (1.71e-14) (0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.041)
male 0.136** -1.39e-16 0.026 0.167** 0.167** 0.174*
(0.067) (1.82e-14) (0.067) (0.085) (0.082) (0.092)
ind -1.612*** 3.47e-17 -1.564*** -2.000*** -2.250*** -1.652***
(0.119) (1.04e-13) (0.114) (0.165) (0.182) (0.245)
black -0.626*** 3.47e-17 -0.308 -0.875*** -0.778*** -0.826***
(0.158) (0.017) (0.261) (0.153) (0.217) (0.282)
white 0.125 0.667*** 0.282*** -0.083 -0.083 -0.087
(0.077) (0.216) (0.101) (0.096) (0.111) (0.082)
other -0.331** -2.78e-17 -0.128 -0.583*** -0.417** 0.000
(0.132) (4.58e-14) (0.127) (0.185) (0.180) (0.209)
2008
PE 0.570*** 0.688*** 0.740*** 0.613*** 0.479*** 0.328***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
PI 0.241*** 0.000 0.183*** 0.282*** 0.236*** 0.259***
(0.019) (0.007) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.033)
male 0.171** 0.000 0.163* 0.250*** 0.181* 0.103
(0.071) (0.006) (0.085) (0.086) (0.104) (0.104)
ind -1.273*** 0.000 -1.356*** -1.484*** -1.875*** -1.362***
(0.134) (0.007) (0.146) (0.161) (0.249) (0.247)
black -0.428** 0.000 -0.529** -0.444** -0.167 -0.345
(0.176) (0.019) (0.229) (0.201) (0.186) (0.372)
white 0.120 0.750*** 0.260** 0.016 -0.097 -0.138
(0.080) (0.187) (0.109) (0.094) (0.111) (0.108)
other -0.437*** 0.000 -0.538*** -0.476** -0.472** -0.276
(0.142) (0.006) (0.176) (0.198) (0.205) (0.225)
2009
PE 0.546*** 0.667*** 0.706*** 0.609*** 0.464*** 0.309***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
PI 0.248*** 0.000 0.191*** 0.250*** 0.286*** 0.250***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028) (0.033)
male 0.278*** 0.000 0.132 0.250** 0.250*** 0.353***
(0.069) (0.013) (0.086) (0.103) (0.093) (0.112)
ind -1.455*** 0.000 -1.485*** -1.500*** -1.750*** -1.353***
(0.125) (0.047) (0.132) (0.226) (0.189) (0.263)
black -0.364** 0.000 -0.706** -0.109 -0.179 -0.603***
(0.185) (0.043) (0.340) (0.302) (0.266) (0.223)
white 0.024 0.333 0.191 0.000 -0.286*** -0.294**
(0.079) (0.209) (0.122) (0.105) (0.101) (0.116)
other 0.057 0.000 -0.294 0.094 0.036 0.147
(0.137) (0.018) (0.196) (0.181) (0.134) (0.320)
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2010
PE 0.559*** 0.688*** 0.741*** 0.600*** 0.468*** 0.308***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012)
PI 0.239*** 0.000 0.185*** 0.200*** 0.261*** 0.192***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032)
male 0.230*** 0.000 0.185** 0.200** 0.162* 0.115
(0.069) (0.024) (0.084) (0.083) (0.090) (0.093)
ind -1.383*** 0.000 -1.370*** -1.800*** -1.910*** -0.808***
(0.137) (0.045) (0.155) (0.183) (0.280) (0.204)
black -0.233 0.000 0.074 -0.400* -0.486** -0.385
(0.180) (0.054) (0.252) (0.228) (0.210) (0.304)
white 0.048 0.625** 0.333*** -1.11e-16 -0.297*** -0.231**
(0.078) (0.262) (0.111) (0.094) (0.093) (0.105)
other -0.465*** 0.000 -0.333** -0.400** -0.676*** -0.308*
(0.129) (0.029) (0.170) (0.160) (0.161) (0.186)
2011
PE 0.562*** 0.688*** 0.737*** 0.609*** 0.467*** 0.306***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
PI 0.222*** 0.000 0.202*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.139***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.029)
male 0.139** 0.000 0.101 0.130 0.217** 0.111
(0.070) (0.016) (0.092) (0.095) (0.092) (0.094)
ind -1.297*** 0.000 -1.293*** -1.391*** -1.767*** -0.972***
(0.133) (0.025) (0.134) (0.168) (0.255) (0.225)
black -0.913*** 0.000 -1.121*** -1.130*** -1.000*** -0.361
(0.177) (0.022) (0.210) (0.207) (0.237) (0.226)
white 0.306*** 1.000*** 0.545*** 0.217** -0.100 -0.139
(0.078) (0.146) (0.131) (0.093) (0.092) (0.094)
other -0.176 0.000 -0.303 -0.261 -0.183 -0.111
(0.143) (0.007) (0.205) (0.171) (0.194) (0.214)
2013
PE 0.525*** 0.714*** 0.727*** 0.571*** 0.389*** 0.261***
(0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
PI 0.292*** 0.143*** 0.273*** 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.174***
(0.019) (0.045) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
male 0.053 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.053 0.087
(0.069) (0.078) (0.107) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084)
ind -1.234*** -0.286** -1.455*** -1.286*** -1.242*** -0.870***
(0.146) (0.144) (0.230) (0.210) (0.222) (0.192)
black -0.464** -0.429** -1.273*** -0.286 -0.126 -0.348*
(0.190) (0.171) (0.285) (0.231) (0.223) (0.202)
white -0.367*** 0.143 -0.273** -0.571*** -0.453*** -0.522***
(0.076) (0.088) (0.121) (0.105) (0.089) (0.102)
other -0.219 -0.143 -0.273 -0.286 -0.358** -0.174
(0.137) (0.145) (0.192) (0.179) (0.178) (0.177)
Continued on next page
62
Table 11 – Continued from previous page
OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90
Total
PE 0.561*** 0.688*** 0.735*** 0.611*** 0.468*** 0.314***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
PI 0.223*** 0.000 0.176*** 0.222*** 0.226*** 0.171***
(0.007) (1.35e-13) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)
male 0.166*** 0.000 0.118** 0.167*** 0.194*** 0.114***
(0.028) (6.73e-14) (0.052) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038)
ind -1.404*** 0.000 -1.412*** -1.667*** -1.919*** -1.057***
(0.054) ( 6.50e-13) (0.051) (0.080) (0.124) (0.098)
black -0.521*** 0.000 -0.618*** -0.667*** -0.468*** -0.429***
(0.072) (3.16e-13) (0.129) (0.098) (0.078) (0.127)
white 0.048 0.625*** 0.206*** -0.056 -0.226*** -0.229***
(0.032) (0.076) (0.045) (0.047) (0.033) (0.050)
other -0.262*** 0.000 -0.353*** -0.333*** -0.323*** -0.114
(0.056) (2.39e-13) (0.072) (0.079) (0.073) (0.095)
Note: *** Significant at 1 %, ** significant at 5 %, * significant at 10 %
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Source: Latinobarometro
Parental education always has a positive and significant effect on educational attainment,
which varies across quantiles, and each of them is significantly different from the OLS-beta.
Parental income decile does not seem to have a significant effect on the quantile .10. As before,
mobility increases from 2007 to 2013. But this time not only quantile .10 is not part of this
phenomenon, but also quantile .25.
Again, it is more convenient to look at a quantile regression graph in order to see the dif-
ferences between quantiles. Figure 3 presents the intercepts across quantiles, as well as the
beta-coefficients for the linear term of parental education and for parental income. The confi-
dence intervals of the OLS and the QR are also indicated.
We can see a similar behavior to that of Figure 1, where mobility increases as we move
to the top of educational attainment distribution. As of parental income decile, its effect also
increases up to the median, then it remains constant, and then it decreases for quantile 0.9.
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Figure 2: Linear Quantile Regression Estimates for Latin America from 2007 to 2013
Going from the estimates of Eq. (1) to those of Eq. (8) prove that non-linearities on the
dependent variable are significant, given that the effect of parental education is different for
every quantile in every year, as shown in Figure 1 and 3.
Subsection 5.2 shows the estimations when both non-linearities are combined.
